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Introduction

Problems in the allocation of lawmaking power between the federal �
government and the states do not-and I am inclined to think that they •·
should not-loom large in the traditional course on confl ict of laws. For
federal law has had little impact on the central topic of that course, the
allocation of lawmaking power among the states, leaving the matter largely
to states' discretionary choices.1 Yet it can be misleading to talk, and
sloppy to think, about federal-state allocations in terms of choice.2 Where
federal law, whatever its source, is pertinent and valid, the Supremacy
Clause makes the choice for us.3 To be sure, the question of pertinence
may call for, as interstate choice of law often calls for, what Brainerd
Currie termed "restraint and enlightenment. "4 It is not useful , however,
to equate a court's role and function in answering questions regarding the
pertinence and validity of federal law5 with the freedom of a state court to
choose the governing law in an interstate case. 6

1. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) (plurality opinion); Douglas Laycock,
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Con stitutional Foun dation s of Choice of Law, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 249, 257-58 (1992). But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23

(1985) (holding that the application of Kansas law to every claim in a nationwide class action was

" sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits"). Elsewhere, I have note.d this trend
against constraints on legislative jurisdiction:
[T)he uniform tendency of our domestic Jaw has been toward the loosening of
mandatory controls on the exercise of lawmaking power, federal and (inter-) state,

with the result that meaningful limitations at both levels are the result of self
restraint. In that process, courts have played a prominent role, if only by default.
Stephen B. Burbank,The World in Our Co urts, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1460 (1991) (reviewing GARY
B. BORN & DAVlD WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CiVlL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (1989)).
2. But see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("When a situation is covered by one of
the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie
choice."); RlCHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERlALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN C!VlL PROCEDURE 269 (6th
ed. 1990) (asserting that United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979), "required a choice
between federal and state law"); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp : The Case for
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 G EO. L.J. 1, l n.2 (1991) ("Choice between competing legal
regimes is also necessary .. . when one party to litigation invokes a state law but the other party
contends that federal law is exclusive and preempts the state law.").
3. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is ThereLifefor Erie Afte r
the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314, 318-21 (1980).
4. BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED
Currie counsels courts, when determining the
policies and interests of the forum state, to consider the possibility that a broad formulation may
directly conflict with the interests of another state. It is proper, in this situation, to "adopt a moderate
definition in order to avoid such a conflict." BRAINERD CURRIE, J11e Verdict of Quiescent Years, in
EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 186 (1963).

SELECTED EssA YS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra, at 584, 604.

The same course may be

appropriate for a court interpreting the reach of federal law.
5. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 3, at 342-44, 351 n.117, 353-54 n.l22 (discussing the
process of considering the pertinence of federal law and pointing out that, once a court finds validity
and pertinence, state law is irrelevant).
6. Alfred Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Ac tions-T11e Converse of the Erie
Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 384, 387 (1956) ("[O]nce the extent of the federal right is established
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The recogmt10n of interstate judgments is also a staple in the
traditional course on conflict of laws , and the emphases of that topic may
seem to contradict, if not the normative, then the empirical proposition
with which I began. 7 For federal law looms very large indeed in the
recognition of interstate judgments . 8 In part because the Supreme Court
has acknowledged the pertinence of oniy federal constitutional and statutory
law, however, the mischief of federal-state "choice of law" has been
avoided . 9 So, alas, have most of the interesting problems . These
problems include sources of authority to make law, notably determining the
pertinence and validity of federal common law, and sources of rules of
law, notably fashioning governing federal law by the incorporation of
existing state (or federal) rules . 10 Those are the problems I wish to
address in this Article, having first set the contexts in which they arise.
In theory, the reach of federal judgments law is broad, and the
extent to which its reach has exceeded the Supreme Court's grasp goes a
long way toward explaining the sorry state of the law of interjurisdictional
preclusion today. The Court has recognized that, even though neither the
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause nor its implementing statute
speaks to litigation that is wholly domestic to one state's courts, the Due
Process Clause may constrain a state's domestic law of preclusion.11 The

there is no room for the operation of local policy, as contrasted with the scope afforded to local policy
in the conflict of laws.") .
7. The same might be said of adjudicatory jurisdiction, although, as an empirical matter, I suspect
that many conflicts teachers rely on the coverage in first-year procedure, revisiting the subject, if at all,
only to make explicit links with choice of law. In any event, the only problem of allocation likely to
be treated concerns the reach of an ackncwledged limitation on state lawmaking power-the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
9. I have previously addressed this issue:
The full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and its implementing statute have
simplified the task in interjurisdictional cases involving state judgments,or so it has
seemed. Thus, in the state-state configuration, the answers to most questions have,
for many years, appeared clear. As a result, recognition ofjudgments was the least
important-and perhaps the most welcome-part of a course in conflict of laws, one
that could as well have been entitled workers' compensation.
Stephen B. Burbank, In terjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law:
A General App roach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 73 4 (1986).
10. In my previous work on judgments, I distinguish between "the source of preclusion law,
federal or state, and . . . the content of the law that may be applicable. " See Burbank, sup ra note 9,
at 823 n.428 (noting that the "distinction is often overlooked "). In refining that distinction for this
Article, I have benefited from the work of Professor Maier. See Harold G. Maier, The A uthoritative
Sources of Customary International Law in the United States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 450 (1989)
(distinguishing "the authoritative source of law from the substantial source of law").
11. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U. S. 461, 482-83 (1982). In Kremer, the
Supreme Court noted that a state must satisfy the applicable requirements of the Due Process Clause
if a judgment rendered in its courts is to have preclusive effect. Elaborating, the Court stated that:
A State may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm
judgment, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord full faith and
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Court has not acknowledged, however, other possible federal constraints
on domestic state preclusion l aw in state court, including federal preemp- ,
tion or, as I prefer to think about it, federal common law . 12 Recent
developments in cognate areas prompt renewed hope that the Court m ay �
see the IightY
This failure to see the potential for federal constraints in addition to
the Constitution in cases that are confined to the courts of one state has
1I
contributed to the Court's fundamental error in interpreting the Full Faith
I
and Credit Statute in interjurisdictional cases . That error lies in imputing
1
to the statute a choice of the domestic preclusion law of the rendering
II
state, 14 rather than the law that would have been applied in the courts of
t
the rendering state. 15 In theory, the latter could include not only domestic
state preclusion law, but also the preclusion law of another state or federal
preclusion law. The costs of the Court's error include not only the
theoretical possibility that, in applying the domestic preclusion law of the
rendering state, the recognizing court will apply law different from that
which would have been applied in the courts of the rendering state,
contrary to the core purpose of full faith and credit/6 but also the harsh
reality that federal rights will disappear in the smoke (and mirrors) of a
presumption against repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Statute by subse
quently enacted federal legislationY
Again, recent developments

I

credit to such a judgment. Section 1738 does not suggest otherwise; other state and
federal courts would still be providing a state court judgment with the "same"
preclusive effect as the courts of the State from which the judgment emerged. In
such a case, there could be no constitutionally recognizable preclusion at all.
!d. (footnotes omitted).
12. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 805.

13. See infra Part II.
14. See, e.g. , Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 525 (1986) (holding that the
"Court of Appeals erred b y refusing to consider the possible preclusive effect, under Alabama law, of
the state-court judgment"); Marrese v. American Academy cf Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U .S. 373,
380 (1985) ("[The Full Faith and Credit Statute] directs a federal court to refer to the preclusion law
of the State in which judgment was rendered .�) .
15. This is the interpretation suggested by the relevant language of the statute:
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same. full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such

State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken .
28 U.S. C. § 1 738 (1988) (emphasis added) . It has always been so. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11,
I Stat. 122.
16. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 798-800.
17. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U .S. 90, 98-99 (1980). In an earlier article, I criticized t!Je
Supreme Court's repeal analysis:
The sll-or-nothing posture of the first case in the recent series, Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90 (1980). misdirected attention from the relationship between federal and
state law to the question of preclusion or no preclusion. The Court p urported to
decide only that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not prevent the application of the "conve
ntional doctrine of collateral estoppel, " id. at 95 n 7 in a case where federal habeas
.

,
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demonstrate that this question of interpretation is not merely of academic
1
interest. 8
One might have thought that the Court, freed of the perceived
constraints of the Full Faith and Credit Statute-as it has been in recent
cases involving the preclusive effects of unreviewed state administrative
pro ceedings in subsequent federal-question l itigation in federal court19would pay careful attention to sources of authority to make law and to
federal interests . Instead, the Court has virtually ignored questions of
power ,20 sending decidedly mixed signals, even in the same case, on its
will ingness to protect federal substantive policies and rights against the
potential ravages of federal or state preclusion law.21
In fact, it should not have been a surprise that, without the security
blanket of the Full Faith and Credit Statute, the Court would ignore, by
assuming the answer to, problems of lawmaking power. After all, the
Court once sought to apply the Full Faith and Credit Statute to problems
beyond its scope22-to determine the preclusive effects of federal judg
ments in state courts .23 More recently the Court has either simply as
serted the applicability of uniform federal law (federal-question
judgments"fA or ducked any inquiry into governing law (diversity judgments):.S

corpus was unavailable. Incredibly, the Court announced its repeal analysis . . .
without,or so it said, first having determined what the full faith and credit statute
requires. . . . The Court's repeal analysis can be made to appear sensible if§ 1 738
embodies a choice of domestic state preclusion law. It cannot be made even to
appear sensible if, as I maintain, the full faith and credit statute chooses not the
preclusion law of the rendering state, but the preclusion law that the courts of the
rendering state would apply. In fact, the Court's repeal analysis makes no sense
on its own terms, and a repeal analysis based on a correct interpretation of§ 1 738
might in some cases yield the conclusion that§ 1 738 does not apply.
Burbank, supra note 9, at 814 n.388 (citations omitted).
18. See infra subpart ID(A).
19. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, IllS. Ct. 2166, 2170 (1990); University
of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U. S. 788, 79 4 (1986).
20. See So/imino, Ill S. Ct. at 21 69-70; Elliott, 478 U. S. at 794; infra text accompanying notes
90-94.
2 1. See infra text accompanying notes 63-88.
22. "Neither the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution nor the implementing statute
appears to speak to the preclusive effects of the proceedings of federal courts. " Burbank, supra note
9, at 736.
23. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 1 65, 1 70 (1 938) ("[f]he judgments and decrees of the federal
courts in a state are declared to have the same dignity in the courts of that state as those of its own
courts in a like case and under similar circumstances."); Embry v. Palmer, 1 07 U.S. 3, 1 0 (1883)
(noting that the judgments of federal courts have been recognized as on the "same footing " with state
court decisions). But see Turnbull v. Payson, 95 U. S. 418, 423 (1877) (" [T]he act of Congress [the
Full Faith and Credit Statute] does not apply to the courts of the United States . . . . ); Burbank , supra
note 9, at 745 (arguing that "the Court's exercise in statutory interpretation [in Embry, 1 07 U.S. at 9]
merely blessed an anterior exercise in federal common law ").
2 4. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324 n.l2 (1971)
( " !n feders.l-question cases, the law applied is federal law. ").
25. There are, however,numerous pre-1938 decisions requiring the application of state preciusion
"
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Finally in this depressingly long list of interesting problems that the
Court has either made uninteresting or wished away, for close to one
hundred years the Court has essentially abandoned internationally foreign
judgments,26 leaving Hilton v. Guyot27 a derelict on the waters of the
law and one that might be thought to pose greater than normal risks
precisely because it lies in international waters . Hilton , it turns out
however, is not the problem, and the Court cannot solve the real problem,
because it lacks both the power and the institutional capacity to do so.28
II.

Federal Judgments Law in Domestic State Litigation

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the Due Process Clause
constrains a state's freedom in according preclusive effect to the j udgments
of its own courts .29 To date, however, it has not acknowledged that
federal law may play a larger role in determining the preclusive effects of
these judgments in domestic state l itigation.30 I have previously argued
that although state preclusion law w ill usually apply, it must, on occasion,
yield to federal common law.31 I will not repeat that argument in full
here, but it may be useful for the benefit of skeptics to explore the
relevance of two Supreme Court cases decided since I developed, and
applied to domestic state l itigation, a general approach to federal common
law.32
Possible reasons for skepticism about the role of federal preclusion
law in state litigation include the knowledge that (1) only rarely has the
Court directed the displacement of state "procedural" law in state court33
and (2) for a long time it seemed to do so only in FELA34 cases .35 Yet,
as a general matter, there can be no doubt either about federal lawmaking
competence in connection w ith " [l]egal rules which impact significantly

law to federal diversity judgments. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 748-53.
26. Hereafter, I shall refer to internationally foreign judgments as simply "foreign judgments,"
distinguishing them from interstate judgments.
27. 159 U. S. 113 (1895).
28. See infra subparts IV(B)-(C).
29. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
31. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 810-17; William V. Luneburg, The Opporrunity to be Heard

and the Doctrines of Preclusion: Federal Limits on State Law, 31 VILL. L. REV. 81, 138-44, 157-62
(1986); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HAR.v. L. REV. 1128, 1183-84
& n. 281 (1986).
32. See generally Burbank, supra note 9.
33. See Dice v. Akron, C.& Y.R.R. , 342 U. S. 359 (1952); Henry M. Hart, Jr. , The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 508 (1954).
34. Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
35. See Hill, supra note 6, at 387-88 (noting in FELA cases "a judicial tendency ... to ascribe
to Congress an intention that federally-created rights sh[ouldj receive uniform enforcement .. .
notwithstanding the concurrent responsibility of the state courts in such enforcement").
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upon the effectuation of federal rights "36 or about the potential of
p reclusion rules to have such an impact. And if there had been any doubt
about the relevance of the former proposition, announced in federal court
litigation, for litigation in state court, Felder v. Casey37 should have
dispelled it.
In Felder, the Court required the displacement of a Wisconsin
statute that the state courts had applied to terminate an
ice-of-claim
not
action brought under section 1 9 8 3 .3 8 It is true that in doing so, the Court
invoked the language of preemption.39 But there is no harm in the
language of preemption, backed up by appeals to the Supremacy Clause,40

36. Burks v. Lasker, 44 I U.S. 471, 477 (1979). In Burks, the Court "made progress in collapsing
analy tical barriers by citing a case displacing state law in state court as sufficiently analogous to lend
supp ort to a discussion of the borrowing of state law in federal court." Burbank,

supra

note 9, at 807

n.359.
37. 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
38. 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 (1988);

see Felder,

487 U.S. at 136-37. The Court described the notice-of-

claim statute as follows:
That statute provides that no action may be brought or maintained against any state
governmental subdivision, agency, or officer unless the claimant either provides
written notice of the claim within 120 days of the alleged injury, or demonstrates
that the relevant subdivision, agency, or officer had actual notice of the claim and
was not prejudiced by the lack of written notice.

Wis. Stat. § 893.80 ( l )(a) (1983

and Supp. 1987). The statute further provides that the party seeking redress must
also submit an itemized statement of the relief sought to the governmental
subdivision or agency, which then has 120 days to grant or disallow the requested
relief. § 893.80(1)(b).

Finally, claimants must bring suit within six months of

receiving notice that their claim has been disallowed. Ibid.

/d.

(footnote omitted).
39.

See

id. at 138. As I have noted elsewhere, "[m]y quarrel is not, of course, with the choice

of the 'preemption' label instead of 'federal common law.'
problems whole.
9, at 808 n.360;

It is rather with the failure to see the

Preemptive lawmaking is a subset of federal common law."

see also

Burbank,

supra

note

id. at 809 n.366 (arguing that "[t]he tendency of commentators to speak the

language of preemption rather than federal common law in the context of state court litigation is
suggestive of the larger issue" of the failure of the Court to address the relationship between preemption
principles and federal common law); Thomas W. Merrill,

The Common Law Powers ofFederal Courrs,

REV. I, 32-39 (1985) (noting the Court's failure to realize that preemptive lawmaking

52 U. CHI. L.

can be used to develop a general theory of federal common law).

It is also true that at one point the Court employed a mode of analysis-treating the problem

as !he converse of that in Erie R.R.v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)-as mischievous as assimilating
federal-state allocation problems to interstate choice of law.

See Felder,

487 U.S. at 151-53;

supra text

accompanying notes 1-6. By analogy to Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the Court

Erie with the state courts' "constitutional
See Burbank, supra note 9, at 755-57, 80810. The problem derives in part from the Court's apparent failure to recognize that Guaranty Tmst
cannot plausibly be deemed a constitutional holding. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of

equated the federal courts' constitutional obligations under
duty" under the Supremacy Clause. This is unfortunate.

Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 700-06 (1974). The converse-Erie reasoning was, however, unnecessary
to the decision.

40.

See id.

See Felder,

487 U.S. at 151.

at 138, 150, 151, 153. The Court's invocation of the Supremacy Clause to vindicate

the supremacy of a federal statute should be distinguished from Professor Weinberg's attempt to make
the Supremacy Clause the source of authority for federal com1non law.

Common Law,

83 Nw. U.L.

See

Louise Weinberg,

REV. 805, 836-38 ( I989); see also infra note 51.

Federal
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so long as the reader observes that in Felder state law was made to yiel d,
not to an identifiable statutory policy choice, but to "the remedial
objectives of § 1 9 8 3 . "41 It would be more faithful to the respective
lawmaking roles of Congress and the federal courts to say that in Felder
the Supreme Court required that a state statute yield, in state court, to
federal common law.
Preclusion law can cut off assertions of legal right made for the first
time. In that, it is functionally similar to the notice-of-claim statute in
Felder for purposes of allocating federal and state lawmaking power.
Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that Felder was not a FELA case.
Indeed, the Court's extensive use of FELA precedent42 merely confirmed
arguments imputing to those cases the general principle that state proce
dural law must, on occasion, yield to federal common law in state court.43
Another of the Supreme Court's recent decisions similarly confirmed
those arguments , albeit indirectly. In University of Tennessee v. Elliott,44
the Court held that unreviewed state administrative fin dings cannot have
preclusive effect in a subsequent Title VII action .45 In the Court's view,
for a federal court to accord state administrative factual findings preclusive
effect would have been inconsistent with the statutory direction that a
federal administrative agency, the EEOC, give such findings only
"substantial weight. "46 In addition , a rule of preclusion would have been
inconsistent with the previously recognized statutory pol icy in favor of a
trial de novo following administrative proceedings .47
Elliott was brought in federal court . What if, however, the plaintiff
had chosen to sue in state court? Imagining such a case before the
Supreme Court's decision in Elliott and its recent decision making clear
that state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction under Title
VII,48 I observed:
In other cases, policies animating federal substantive law
may require a rule less preclusive than that provided by
domestic state law. If, for example, we assume that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction of title VII actions, the question

4 1 . Felder, 487 U .S. at 13 8 .
42 . See id. at 1 3 8 (citing Brown v. Western R . R . , 3 3 8 U . S. 294, 296 (1949)) ; id. at ISO (citing

Brown and Monessen S.W . Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U .S . 330, 336 (1988));

id. at 1 52 (citing Brown).
43 . See CHARLES A. WRIG HT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS§ 45, at 272-73 (4th ed . !983);
BurbRnk, supra note 9, at 807- 1 0 ; Meltzer, supra note 3 1, at 1 1 80-85 .
44. 478 U . S . 788 ( 1986).
45 . !d. at 796.
46. !d. at 795 (citing 42 U . S . C . § 2000 e-S(b) ( 1988)) .

47. !d. at 795-96. See also Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U . S . 840, 848 ( 1976) (observing that

Congress intended in the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 to accord federal employees the same right
to a trial de novo as was provided in the a mended Civil Rights Act of 1964) .
4 8 . Yellow Freight Sys., lnc. v. Donnelly, 494 U .S . 820 ( 1990).

. I

j
!
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may arise whether in such an action brought in state court, that
court can apply domestic law according preclusive effect to the
adjudicatory proceedings of a state administrative agency that is
a deferral agency under title VII.

A strong argument can be

made that application of the state rule would be inconsistent with
policies animating title VII.

Because the EEOC is required to

give only "substantial weight" to administrative findings of
deferral agencies, and assuming Congress did not intend in that
regard to distinguish between investigative and adjudicatory
administrative action, it makes no sense to permit a court,
federal or state, to give those findings preclusive effect. Doing
so

would

seriously

undermine

the

federal

administrative

process.49

I hope we can agree, at least after Felder, that the reasons the Court gave
for refusing to apply a rule of preclusion to the Title VII claim in Elliott
would also require displacement of a state-law rule of preclusion if that
case had been filed in state court. Moreover, even though we may not
agree about the role of the Rules of Decision Act50 in bringing about the
results, 51 or about the util ity of "preemption" analysis/2 we should be

49. Burbank,supra note 9, at 813 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 821 n.419 ("The Court's
reasons for refusing preclusive effect to an unappealed arbitration award in a federal § 1983 action are
equally applicable in a state § 1983 action.").
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.").
51. For a fully developed statement of my views about the role of the Rules of Decision Act in
authorizing and limiting federal common law, see Burbank, supra note 9, at 753-74,787-97, 808-10,
816-17. Professor Redish now agrees with me, at least as to the relevance of the Act for federal
common law that is not "procedural." See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE
POLITICAL ORDER 29-46 (1991); Burbank, supra note 1, at 1479 n.l26.
Professor Weinberg terms it "curious" that she does "not find scholarly discussion of the
meaning of the words [in the Rules of Decision Act], 'except where the Constitution ... otherwise
require[s].' " Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme
Federal Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 860, 865 n.28 (1989) [hereinafter Weinberg, Curious Notion].
Because! have devoted considerable attention to that language, I agree. See, e.g. , Burbank, supra note
9, at 758-62, 773-74, 787-91. If Professor Weinberg had seriously engaged work other than Professor
Redish's, she might have found what she was looking for; Professor Redish's work takes an
impoverished view of the Rules of Decision Act. See REDISH, supra, at 161 n.95; George D. Brown,
Bright Lines, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 293, 297-302, 308-11 (reviewing REDISH, supra). What I find
curious is the notion that the "supremacy clause requires courts to . . . fashion federal case law."
Weinberg, Curious Notion, supra, at 865; see also id. at 870 ("[A]s the Constitution requires . . . all
courts must work under federal common law when the supremacy clause so requires."); Weinberg,
supra note 40, at 816-17, 836-38 (reiterating Weinberg's view of the Supremacy Clause).
The
Supremacy Clause is not a source of lawmaking power; it merely states that valid and pertinent federai
law is supreme. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107..09
(1989); Henry P. Monaghan,Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91 COLUM.
L. REv. 233,242-43 (1991); Westen & Lehman, supra note 3, at 370.
I also find curious Professor Weinberg's reliance on the fact that the Rules of Decision Act
speaks directly only to federal courts as proof against the Act's relevance to federal common-law
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able to agree that the results themselves are not easily explai ned by
traditional federal common-law analysis . 53
III .

Federal Judgments Law in Interjurisdictional Cases

A.

Federal Common-Law Analysis and Repeal Analysis Distinguished

Once it is clear that, in l itigation confined to the tribunals of one
state, the governing preclusion law need not be domestic state law, but may

making. See Weinberg, Curious Notion, supra, at 862, 865, 870. We agree that state courts are bound
to apply p ertinent and valid federal common law, and that they have an obligation to d etermine whether

there is such law and what its content is in cases before them. See id. at 871 -73; Burbank, supra note
9, at 800, 807- 1 0 . Professor Weinberg also recognizes that state court decisions on matters involving
federal common law are reviewable by the Supreme Court. See Weinberg, Curious Notion, supra, at
873 . The Supreme Court is a federal court bound by the Rules of Decision Act and, incidentally, so
regarded itself even when the Act referred to "trials at common law . " Compare id. at 869-70
(suggesting a process of inference without authority) with Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236
( 1 944) ("It is the duty of the federal appellate courts, as well as the trial court, to ascertain and apply
the state law where, as in this case, it controls decision. ") and McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
270, 277 ( 1 830) (noting that state statutes of limitations "form a rule of decision in the courts of the
United States" unless Congress has made "special provision") . When p redicting what the Supreme
Court would hold on an unsettled question of federal common law, a sensible state court would take
into consideration limitations on the Court's lawmaking powers. See Burbank , supra note 9, at 809
n.366.
Anyone interested in the other objections Professor Weinberg makes will find a l l o f them

addressed, I hope adequately, in the same article. See, e.g., id. at 7 6 1 n . l 21 (discussing various
techniques to avoid confronting the Rules of Decision Act); id. at 761 -62 (comparing federal common
law under the Rules of Decision Act and under traditional analysis) . And anyone who thinks that
Clearfield Trust, Sabbatino, or Borak are strong points in an argument against the relevance of the
Rules of Decision Act to federal common-law making should follow Professor Weinberg's own advice
and do " much more thinking about the Act. " Weinberg, Curious Notion, supra, at 870 . In doing so,
I would hope that interested persons, including Professor Weinberg, would distinguish between sources
of authority and sources of rules. Cj . Burbank , supra note 9, at 771 ("When required to displace state
law, federal judges have the p ower to fashion a substitute that is fully adequate in light of all of the
policies and interests that a common law court would consider . . . . "); id. at 766-67 (questioning
whether the existence of a federal interest requires uniform federal rules) .
52 . See supra text accompanying notes 39-4 1 .
53. See Burbank, supra note 9 , at 808- 1 0 (noting that analysis of federal law in state court suggests
deficiencies in traditional federal common-law analysis); cj. Monaghan, supra note 5 1 , at 253 n . l 26
("Although state courts may be obliged to entertain jurisdiction and to provide a remedy materially
parallel to the federal remedy . . . federal preemption of state jurisdictional, procedural, and remedial
rules to the extent that they obstruct enforcement of federal law does not pro tanto transform the
character of the state courts. " ) .
I t would be confounding t o speak o f state preclusion law operating a s borrowed federal law
in state court. So long as the Rules of Decision Act is on the statute books, I know of nothing that
makes either the notion or the description of judicial borrowing more acceptable to explain results in
federal court. It cannot be the common ground that there is federal judicial power to prevent conflict
between state law and a scheme of federal substantive rights . We should reserve talk about judges
borrowing state law for situations when federal courts fashion uniform judge-made rules and they
choose to model them on state law. See In re lnflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft
Approaching Athens, Greece on April 2, 1 986, 778 F. Supp. 625, 63 1 -32 ( E .D . N .Y. 1 9 9 1 ) . State law

very rarely applies of its own force in federal court, and when it does not, the Rules of Decision Act,

reflecting Congress's borrowing, is the source of authority for its application. See Burbank , supra note
9, at 762, 770-7 1 .

Sources of Authority and Rules

1 56 1

rather be the preclusion law of another state o r federal law, the house of
cards that the Supreme Court has constructed in recent cases involving the
Full Faith and Credit Statute collapses .54 It would hardly unify the
country to require a recognizing court to apply a different preclusion law
namely, the domestic preclusion law of the rendering state-than the
rendering state's courts themselves would apply. 55 The Full Faith and
Credit Statute thus means what is says/6 and because it makes no choice
of law, the search for another statute expressly or impliedly repealing it is
us ually a wild goose chase. 57 Such a search makes sense only when it is
proposed to depart from the choice that Congress did make in the Full
Faith and Credit Statute, namely the choice of the rendering state's courts
as the referent for determining the governing preclusion law in the courts
of other states and in federal courts . 58
What difference does it make whether the Full Faith and Credit
Statute is interpreted to choose, as the Supreme Court has required, the
domestic preclusion law of the rendering state or, as I advocate, the law
that would be applied in the courts of the rendering state? In theory, it
may make a substantial difference, or so I have argued . The measure of
that difference lies in a comparison of the reach or impact of federal
common law, on the one hand, and of express or implied repeals by
subsequently enacted federal statutes , on the other. 59 In practice, the

54. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
55. See supra text accompanying note 16.
56. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

57. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Moreover, even accepting the Court's interpretation
of§ 1738, "repeal analysis should focus on the question whether [Congress intended] that preclusion
questions ...arising [under a subsequently enacted statute] be detennined by (uniform) federal rather
than state law. After all, state law may not preclude." Burbank,

supra note 9, at 817-18.
58. Attention to Congress's choice of a state court referent causes problems when another statute

evinces special concern for a federal forum:
The solicitude of the 1871 Congress for the availability of a federal forum
has led to holdings that section 1983 expressly authorizes an injunction within the
meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act and that the normal rule regarding exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply in section 1983 actions.
solicitude, when

a

In light of that

plaintiff has exercised a preference for a federal forum to pursue

a claim under section 1983, is there not something odd in pretending that he did not
exercise that preference?

credit statute requires.

Yet that is exactly what the reinterpreted full faith and

From this perspective-when the right question is asked

the two statutes reasonably may be deemed "in irreconcilable conflict."

Burbank, supra note 9, at 818 (footnotes omitted); cf. id. at 825 (arguing that§ 1738 does not apply
in cases raising claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts).

59. Elsewhere, I have compared the reach of the Supreme Court's repeal analysis with the reach
of federal com..'!1on law:
The Supreme Court's repeal analysis requires clear evidence of congressional intent
on a specific issue that Congress rarely addresses.

Apart from the fact that the

basic premise of the Court's repeal analysis is wrong, the analysis imposes entirely
too much on unsuspecting Congresses, that is, on all Congresses legislating before

1980. This is hardly the heyday of federal common law, even in its traditional

manifestations.

But, on the assumption that the reinterpreted full fait.IJ and credit
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Court's failure to see the displacement of state "procedural " law in state·
court as but another manifestation of federal common law may have
narrowed the theoretical gap considerably, 60 and that failure no doubt' �.
would support the view that the difference between federal commo n l aw
and repeal analysis is only of academic interest. Yet, however flawed the
Court's reasoning in Felder v. Casey,61 the case stands as contemporary
evidence that a general approach to the problem of allocating federal and
state lawmaking power is possible. Federal common law is the most
appropriate vehicle. 62
The Supreme Court's recent forays into interjurisdictional preclusion
speak with a forked tongue on this question. In Elliott, with the Full Faith
and Credit Statute rightly or wrongly out of the picture, 63 the Court
thought, rightly or wrongly, that it was required to confront the problem
of federal common law.64 The Court's conclusion in Elliott, that a rule
of preclusion would be inconsistent w ith Title VII, 65 although supported
by specific language in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. , 66 is
difficult to reconcile with the holding in, or general tenor of, Kremer.67

statute applies, federal common law analysis,whether of the traditional type or
under the Rules of Decision Act, holds greater potential to protect federal
substantive rights than does the Court's repeal analysis.
Burbank,supra note 9, at 819 (footnotes omitted). I also described this difference as "the difference
between 'asking what collateral or subsidiary rules [of preclusion] are necessary to effectuate or to
avoid frustrating the specific intentions of [ Congress],' . . . and requiring evidence of specific intent
as to preclusion matters. " Id. at 819 n.413 (quoting Merrill,supra note 39,at 36); see also Luneburg,
supra note 31,at 143-44 (arguing that the Supreme Court's approach adopts an unnecessarily restrictive
reading of § 1738 and requires finding an implied repeal of that statute).
60. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
61. 487 U.S. 131 (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
62. Cf Susan N. Herman,Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L.REv.
1057,1069-70 (1989) ("The Supreme Court in Felder is continuing a trend toward minimizing the role
of state law,maximizing the creation of federal common law, and exalting the desirability of uniformity
between state and federal courts in adjudication of federal rights.").
63. See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986). The Court may have
surrendered too easily on the question whether 28 U.S.C. § 1738 applies to administrative proceedings.
To be sure,the statute refers to the "judicial proceedings of any court." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, uses the language "judicial Proceedings," U.S. CONST.
art. rv, § 1, and applies to state administrative proceedings as well. See Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 270-72 (1980). The Clause,by its own terms, does not bind federal courts.
See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938). There is no evidence that the First Congress intended
a different meaning in the Full Faith and Credit Statute, passed to implement and make applicable to
the federal courts the Full Faith and Credit Clause. When the Statute was first passed,administrative
proceedings were not even contemplated, and thus perhaps they should not be excluded from the
Statute. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795 (noting that both the Constitution and § 1738 "antedate the
development of administrative agencies").
64. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 794.
65. See id. at 795-96; supra text accompanying notes 43-47.

66. 456 U.S. 461,470 n.7 (1982) , quoted in Elliott, 478 U. S. at 793.
67. In Kremer, the Court held that Title VII did not expressly or impliedly repeal the Full Faith
and Credit Statute, and it did so without resolving whether claims under Title VII were within the
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The key is that Kremer, in which state proceedings did have preclusive
effect in subsequent Title VII l itigation, involved administrative
proceedings reviewed by a state court, thus triggering the Full Faith and
Credit Statute and the Court's repeal analysis .68 Elliott, in which no
preclusion was permitted as to Title VII, seems to confirm my contention
that federal common-law analysis is more protective of federal policies and
federal substantive rights than is repeal analysis . 69
But what the Court in Elliott confirmed in one part of the opin ion,
it confuted in another. The Court held that the unreviewed state ad
ministrative proceedings could preclude Elliott's claim under section 1 9 83 .
In doing so, the Court relied very heavily on cases finding no express or
implied partial repeal of the Full Faith and Credit Statute, concluding that
" [t] he Court's discussion in Allen suggests that it would have reached the
same result even in the absence of § 1 7 3 8 . "70 Perhaps, but only because
the Court in Allen was confused about the relationship between judge-made
law and statutes .71 Repeal analysis requires very clear evidence of
Congress's intent as to the specific question of preclusion. As the Court
demonstrated in McDonald v. City of West Branch72 and elsewhere in
Elliott itself, federal common-law analysis should consider whether a judge
made rule of preclusion is consistent with the language, structure, and
policies of a statute viewed as a whole. 73

exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. See Kremer, 456 U. S. at 476,479 n.20.
68. See id. at 469-70 & n.7 ; see also Gjellum v. City of Birmingham,Ala.,829 F.2d 1056,1067
n.24 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that the Court in Kremer rejected arguments based on congressional intent
"where the full faith and credit statute applies because a state courr judgment is involved " (emphasis
in original)).
69. "The question actually before us is whether a common-law rule of preclusion would be
consistent with Congress' intent in enacting Title VII." Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796; see supra text
accompanying notes 59-61; see also Gjellum, 829 F.2d at 1068 (stating that " [t]he Court's treatment
of issue preclusion questions in the Title VII context therefore suggests that the full faith and credit
statute is a more stringent requirement than the policies favoring resort to state preclusion law where
section 1738 is inapplicable"); Duggan v. Board of Educ.,818 F.2d 1291, 1294 (7th Cir. 1987) ("But
the intent of Congress was no more explicit in the context of Title VII, yet the Supreme Court in Elliott
had no difficulty in inferring it. ").
70. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797.
71 . The Court seemed to equate "the traditional rules of preclusion " with § 1738 for purposes of
its repeal analysis. See Allen v. McCurry,449 U.S. 90, 97-99 (1980); Burbank, supra note 9,at 807
n.358; infra note 88 and accompanying text.

72. 466 u.s. 284 (1984).
73. See id. at 292 (" [A)ccording preclusive effect to arbitration awards in § 1983 actions would
surely undermine the protection of federal rights that the statute is designed to provide. "); see also

Elliott, 478 U. S. at 795-96; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1985); supra
text accompanying notes 44-47, 63-69. Professor Chemerinsky misreads Elliott as if the Court's
conclusion about Elliott's § 1983 claim also applied to his Title VII claim. See E RWI N CHEMERlNSKY,
FEDERAL JURJSDICTION § 8.10, at 442-43 (1989). Misreadings of Elliott are common, however. See,
e.g. , Nelson v.Jefferson County, Ky., 863 F.2d 18, 19 (6th Cir. 1988) (neglecting two of the three
prerequisites to preclusion adopted in Elliott) , cerr. denied, 493 U.S. 820 (1989); Buckhalter v. Pepsi-
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The Court's most recent interjurisdictional preclusion decision .
although hardly a model of analytical precision, highlights the differenc� · .
·
at issue. I n Astoria Federal Savings and Loan Ass 'n v. Solimino/4 the
question was whether the unreviewed findings of a state administrative
agency have preclusive effect in a subsequent federal action under the Age _, .
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1 967 (ADEA) .75 In holding that
such findings have no preclusive effect, the Court reasoned that there is a
presumption of " administrative estoppel , " 76 but that it is "properly
accorded sway only upon legislative default, applying where Congres s has
failed expressly or impliedly to evince any intention o n the issue. •m
More important for present purposes, the Court distinguished this "lenient
presumption in favor of administrative estoppel "78 from a rule of clear
statement and "the kindred rule that legislative repeals by implication will
not be recognized 'absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary. ' " 79
Two factors suggest that the Court tracked the distinction between
federal common-law analysis and repeal analysis in Solimino: ( 1 ) its
observation that repeal analysis did " not cast its shadow here" 80 because
the Full Faith and Credit Statute did not apply, and (2) its actual implemen
tation of the "lenient presumption in favor of administrative estoppel . "8 1
Unlike Title VII, on which it was modeled, the ADEA contains no
direction to the EEOC to accord " substantial weight" to state administrative
findings . 82 The linchpin of the Court's analysis in Elliott with respect to
Title VII was, thus, not available in Solimino. 83 Nonetheless, the Court
found other evidence of what it chose to call the congressional " decision"
not to accord preclusive effect to state administrative findings . 84 In

Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 820 F.2d 892, 893 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating erroneously that Elliott was
"precluded from relitigating his civil rights claim under . . . § 1983 ") ; id. at 895-97 (neglecting to note
whether the arbitration proceedings would have preclusive effect in the rendering state).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

111 S. Ct. 2166 (1991).
29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).

Solimino, 111 S. Ct. at 2169.
!d. at 2170.
Id. at 2172.
79. ld. at 2170 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 4 1 7 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
80. ld.
81. ld. at 2172.

82. Id. at 2171-72.
83 . The Court, however, found nothing "talismanic " about Title VII's directive. !d. at 2172.
This language was "simply the most obvious piece of evidence that administrative res judicata does not
operate in a Title Vll suit." Id. (quoting Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291, 1297 (7th Cir.
1987)).
84. Id. Particularly because the Court noted the district court's holding in favor of preclusion "by
virtue of Congress' failure in either the language or legislative history of the Age Act ' actually [to]
addres[s] the issue, ' " id. at 2169 (quoting the district court), such hyperbole (characterizing
congressional inaction as a decision) makes even preemption rhetoric sound good. See supra text
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reality, the evidence supported only the conclusion that a judge-made rule
of administrative preclusion would be inconsistent with the structure of,
and policies animating, the ADEA.85 That, of course, is all that is neces
sary under federal common-law analysis. 86 Unlike its treatment of section
1983 in Elliott, 87 in Solimino the Court made a serious attempt to grapple
with the implications of preclusion for the statutory scheme. 88
B.

Untangling Sources of A uthority from Sources of Rules

The use of federal common-law analysis rather than repeal analysis
under the Full Faith and Credit Statute is thus of both theoretical and
practical interest. Yet were the Court aware of the issue, it still might be
reluctant to adopt the interpretation I have urged . 8 9 Under the Court's
approach to section 1 73 8 , there usually is no question either about the
source of authority (federal) or the source of rules (state) . My approach
invites questions as to both the source of authority and the source of rules
by requiring inquiry as to the law that would have been applied if the
subsequent action had been brought in the rendering state's courts rather
than in the courts of another state or in federal court.
Even when section 1 738 does not apply in interjurisdictional cases,
the Court appears reluctant to be precise about sources of authority or
sources of rules . Neither in Elliott nor in Solimino did the Court discuss
the authority for the application of federal law. Rather, the Court simply
assumed that, although the Full Faith and Credit Statute did not apply,
federal law governed and that its only task was to determine the content of
that law . SQ For one familiar with cases involving the preclusive effects
of the federal-question judgments of federal courts ,91 Elliott's laconic

accompanying note 52.
85. See So/imino, I l l S . Ct. at 2 172 (holding that § 1 4(b) of the ADEA, which requires
complainants under the Act to first pursue their claims with responsible state authorities before filing
federal actions, " suffices to outweigh the lenient presumption in favor of administrative estoppel, a
holding that also comports with the broader scheme of the Age Act and the provisions for its
enforcement" ) .
8 6 . See supra text accompanying note 73 .
8 7 . See supra text accompanying notes 70-72 .
8 8 . So/imino, I l l S. Ct. at 2 1 70-7 1 . Although in So/imino the Court quoted a passage from A llen
that seemed highly protective of judge-made rules of preclusion, 1 1 1 S . Ct. at 2 1 7 1 (quoting Allen v .
McCurry, 449 U . S . 90 , 97-98 (1980)), contrasting § 1 983 with Title Vll, i t did not recognize, o r a t
least acknowledge, that i n Allen and that part o f Elliott treating § 1 9 8 3 , the Court had applied a
different analysis. See supra text accompanying note 7 1 .
89. I do not refer to suspicions that the Court's rediscovery of the Full Faith and Credit Statute
in civil rights cases was no coincidence. For an explanation of my views on this subject, see Burbank,

supra note 9, at 80 1 .

90. See University of Tenn . v. Elliott, 478 U . S . 788, 79�·-95, 796-97 (1986); Solimino, 1 1 1 S .
C t . a t 2 1 69-70.
9 1 . See supra text accompanying note 24.
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observation that "we have frequently fashioned federal common-law rules
of preclusion in the absence of a governing statute"92 is not surp rising.
Indeed, the Court cited some of those cases in support of its observa
tion . 93 Yet even if (as I believe) uniform federal l aw governs the
preclusive effects of the federal-question judgments of federal courts,94 it
may not be inunediately obvious why uniform federal law should also
govern the preclusive effects of state administrative proceedings determin
ing matters of state law .
Although at least some of the cases relied o n in Elliott involved the
creation or application of uniform federal judge-made rules of preclu
sion,95 the Court's refusal to resort to such rules for determining whether
Elliott's section 1983 claim was precluded is proof enough that its
reference to "federal common-law rules of preclusion"96 was not intended
to, or at least did not, encompass uniform preclusion rules . Put another
way, in referring to federal common-law rules of preclusion, the Court was
assuming a federal source of authority, not specifying a federal source of
rules .
Under traditional federal common-law analysis, the question whether
a federal substantive claim is precluded by prior proceedings is a question
as to which federal lawmaking competence exists no matter what the
rendering forum, federal or state. rn Because the Court determined that
precluding Elliott's Title VII claim98 and Solimino 's ADEA claim99
would be inconsistent with those statutes , it was not called upon to reach
the further question whether, if preclusion were permissible, the rules
would be uniform federal judge-made rules or state-law rules borrowed as
federal law. 100

92 . Elliott, 478 U.S. at 794.
93 . The cases cited in Elliott were: Park.lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U . S . 322 ( 1 979); Blonder
Tongue Lab. , Inc. v . University of lll. Found. , 402 U . S . 3 1 3 ( 1 97 1) ; Chicot County Drainage Dist.
v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U . S . 3 7 1 ( 1 940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U . S . 1 65 ( 1 93 8) ; and Gunter v .
Atlantic Coast Line R . R . , 200 U . S . 273 ( 1 906) . All involved the federal-question judgments o f federal
courts.
94. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 762-78 .
95 . See supra note 93 . A difficulty i n classifying pre- 1 93 8 decisions arises from the "high degree
of homogeneity in preclusion law throughout the country . . . fostered by the Supreme Court's
invocation of or reliance on 'general common law. ' " Burbank, supra note 9, at 765 (footnote omitted) .
96. Elliott, 478 U . S . at 794 .
97. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37 . The same is true when the rendering forum is in
another country. See infra text accompanying notes 1 93 -94.
9 8 . See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 82-88 .
1 00 . For further discussion regarding this inquiry, see U nited States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. , 440

U . S . 7 1 5 , 728-29 ( 1 979) (asserting that state law may be adopted as the federal rule of decision, but
only after the court accounts for considerations of uniformity and also determines whether the

application of state law would frustrate a federal program's objectives); Burbank, supra note 9, at 75758 (describing the two-step inquiry to determine whether to fashion a uniform federal judge-made rule
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The same results may follow if one takes the Rules of Decision Act
seriously and, in particular, regards it as speaking to the circumstances in
which it is permissible for a federal court to fashion or apply federal judge
made law. The major difference is that the Act itself is the source of
authority to apply federal law. State preclusion law, usually the source of
rules by reason of the Act's choice, could not preclude Elliott's Title VII
clai m or Solimino 's ADEA claim because, under the Act's exception
clau se, those statutes required otherwise. 101 In those circumstances ,
perhaps life is too short to insist on an inquiry into the precise content of
the otherwise applicable state law _ wz
The Court's dubious conclusion-that permitting state administrative
proceedings to preclude Elliott's section 1 983 claim would not be
inconsistent with that statute103-required it to proceed to the next step of
traditional federal common-law analysis. A paean to the benefits of giving
preclusive effect to the adjudicative findings of an administrative agency
might have suggested that, where the prerequisites for administrative
preclusion under federal law announced in United States v. Utah Construc
tion & Mining Co. 104 were met, preclusion would follow under that l aw,
namely, as a matter of uniform federal common law. 105 But the Court

of preclusion or whether to adopt state p reclusion law as federal law) .
1 0 1 . I have p reviously described the weaknesses of traditional common-law analysis in light of the
Rules of Decision Act:
The traditional two-step inquiry is not necessary to protect federal
interests, and it may have led to a misallocation of lawmaking within the federal
government.

If the Constitution or acts of Congress, fairly read, provide for or

require federal common law, state law does not apply.

The same is true whether

a uniform federal rule is called for or a particular state rule is found to be hostile
to or inconsistent with federal interests . In other cases where the Constitution does
not so ordain, state law applies, not "of its own force" and not by judicial grace or
borrowing, but because Congress has borrowed it.

The considerations that have

p rompted the Court to eschew independent choice of law rules in diversity cases,

a result not required by the Constitution, are not pertinent outside that context. The
same is true with respect to the freedom of the federal courts to determine the law
of a particular state.

Burbank,
1 02 .

supra

Cj.

note 9, at 762 (footnotes omitted) .

Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, Ala . , 829 F.2d 1056, 1 064 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 987) ("At some

point, the importance of the federal rights and limited ability of the state forum to function as final
adj udicator of those rights would require such sub stantial supplemental federal preciusion requirements
as to make resort to state p reclusion rules a mere token gesture achieved at the expense of judicial
economy. " ) .
1 03 .

See

University o f Tenn . v. Elliott, 4 7 8 U . S . 7 8 8 , 796-97 ( 1 986); supra text accompanying

notes 70-73 .
a

1 0 4 . 3 8 4 U . S . 394 (1 966) . The Court stated that " [w]hen an administrative agency is acting in

judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact p roperly before it which the parties have had an

adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply

!d.

a t 422.
105.

See Elliott,

478 U . S . at 797-9 8 .

res judicata to

enforce repose . "
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then invoked federalism values106 and held that a federal court is to "give
the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it woul d b e
entitled in the State's courts, " 107 subject to the check of the Utah
Construction prerequisites . 108 That is, the courts should act as if the Full
Faith and Credit Statute did apply. Under this regime, adjudicative
findings of a state administrative agency will be preclusive only if state law
accords them that effect. The result is a hybrid of federal and state law'
the latter specified by a uniform federal choice-of-law rule.
Elliott can thus be seen as a case in which the Court decided that'
section 1738 being inapplicable, federal common law governed . But
federal common law often borrows state law, displacing it only when
hostile to or inconsistent with federal law. In connection with Elliott's
section 1 9 83 claim, the Court decided to borrow state law . Not being
bound by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 109 to follow
state choice-of-law rules, and anxious to replicate the results that would
obtain under section 1738 as closely as possible, the Court (uniformly)
chose the domestic preclusion law of the rendering state (which may or
may not be the state in which the federal court sits) .U0 But the Court
also established the prerequisites for administrative preclusion under federal
law as a uniform check on the application of state law that would
preclude. 111 In other words, having (probably erroneously) failed to find
a threshold barrier to the application of a (state or federal) rule of
preclusion to Elliott's section 1 983 claims , the Court turned to trans
substantive federal preclusion law for a check. 112

·

·

106. See id. at 798-99.
107. ld. at 799.
108. ld.
109. 3 1 3 U. S. 487, 496 ( 1 94 1 ) ; see Burbank, supra note 9 , at 768.
1 1 0. See Elliott, 478 U. S. at 799. In fact, the Court's formulation, see supra text accompanying
note 107, is linguistically consistent with the interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Statute that I
have advocated. See supra text accompanying notes 1 5 , 55-57. As with similar formulations in cases
interpreting § 1 73 8 , " [w] e can safely assume that the Court meant , . . that the statute ' directs a federal
court to refer to the preclusion law of the State in which the [decision] was rendered. " ' Burbank, supra
note 9, at 802 (quoting Marrese v. American Academy of Or.hopaedic Surgeons, 470 U. S. 3 7 3 , 3 80
(1 985)) .
1 1 1 . See Elliott, 478 U. S. at 799.
1 12 . See id. at 797-98 (citing United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co. , 384 U. S. 3 94 ( 1966)).
There is irony in calling the regime established in Utah Construction trans-substantive preclusion law,
b ecause the decision was very much influenced by the substantive context in which it was d ecided. See

Construction, 3 84 U. S. at 4 1 8-23 (noting that the language and policies u nderlying the disputes
cLause in the contract at issue as well as the policies served by the act governi ng this relationship
necessitate the holding that the Court of Claims' findings are final). "But the pull toward applying the
same rule to different substa ntive contexts has been so strong that substantive concerns originally

Utah

anima ting a rule are forgotten, and attempts to carve out an exception in a particular substantive context

are vigorously resisted." Burbank, supra note i, at 1 466.
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From the point of view of the jurisprudence of federal common law,
tt
-. Ellio is a fascinating case. Moreover, apart from the Court's error in
conflating federal common-law and repeal analysis, 11 3 if one concluded
that administrative preclusion is not always inconsistent with section 1 983,
there would be much to be said for the Court's result . The Full Faith and
Credit Statute enjoins a particular kind of federalism for a particular pur
pose. 1 14 In Elliott, that statute did not apply, but it does not hold a
monopoly on federal ism. Both the Rules of Decision Act115 and section
19 88116-either might have been thought to apply as the source of
authority in Elliott-look to state law as the usual source of rules. Neither
constrains a federal court's power to choose which state's law to apply.
More than symmetry counseled choice of the preclusion law of the
te
whose
administrative tribunal rendered the decision claimed to have
sta
preclusive effect. Litigants should be able to know the preclusion law that
will govern the results of litigation because they may shape their conduct
in l ight of it. That suggests that when a dispute is about, in the sense that
it expressly concerns, matters of state law, and it is adjudicated in a state
tribunal , the assumption should be that the preclusion law of that state will
apply. 1 17
Under the Rules of Decision Act, when state preclusion law is
inconsistent with the pol icies of a federal statute, the federal statute
requires that state preclusion law not apply. 1 1 8 This may be true not only
of inconsistency with discrete and specifically identifiable federal statutory
policies , but also of inconsistency w ith a scheme of federal substantive
rights as a whole. 11 9 It is reason enough for concern that we put a
congressionally created scheme of federal substantive rights at the mercy
of federal judge-made trans-substantive preclusion rules , the content of
which was unknown to, and unknowable by, the members of Congress who
passed the statute. 1 20 It would be intolerable simply to loose on the

1 1 3 . See supra text accompanying notes 70-73 .
1 1 4 . See Burbank, supra note 9, at 739-40, 797-800.
1 1 5 . See supra notes 50-5 L
1 1 6 . 42 U . S . C . § 1988 ( 1 988) . For analysis of this statute, see Burbank, supra note 9, at 806..{)7,
8 1 9 n . 409, 822 n.427, and see generally Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions:
Some Old Light on Section 1988, 1 3 3 U. PA. L. REv. 60 1 ( 1 985) .
1 1 7 . q. Burbank, supra note 9, at 797 (arguing that "a system of preclusion rules for diversity

judgments keyed to the locus of subsequent litigation would be hopeless "); id. at 767 (discussing the
administrability problems litigants would encounter if state law determined the preclusive effects of
federal question judgments).
1 1 8 . See supra text accompanying note 1 0 1 .
1 1 9 . See Burbank, supra note 9, at 8 1 6 (arguing that "[w ]hen the Court determines that state law,

in a domestic case, puts 'unreasonable obstacles in the way ' of a federal scheme of substantive rights,
it applies federal common law,and it can do so in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of
Decision Act" (quoting Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U . S . 22, 25 ( 1 923)) .
1 20 _ q. id. at 8 1 5 ("The effect of modern preclusion rules is to cut off some substantive rights
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federal statutory scheme state preclusion rules , which are no more part of
the federal legislative background than are federal statutes p art of the
background against which the state rules are fashioned . Elliott uses trans
substantive federal preclusion law as a check on state preclus io n law . This
is a technique similar to what I have recommended elsewhere as a means
to protect a scheme of federal rights :
[J]ust as federal preclusion law can serve as an initial check for
state judges alert to their duty to safeguard particular federal
substantive

policies,

so may it serve as a reference when the

concern is the effect of state law, including state preclusion law,
on federal substantive

rights .

Although typically trans-substan

tive, federal preclusion law is at least fashioned by judges
against the background of the substantive law with which it
interacts.
fashioned,

When the application of state law, which is not so
would

preclude

federal

precluded under federal law, further

substantive

rights

not

inquiry is warranted. 1 21

Perhaps the most consequential of the uniform federal checks
imposed on the application of state " administrative estoppel" in Elliott, and
that which is of greatest interest for present purposes , is the requirement
that "the parties have had an adequate opportunity to l itigate. " 1 22 In
Utah Construction the Court elaborated on that concept as follow s :
I n the present case the Board was acting i n a judicial capacity
when it considered the . . . claims , the factual disputes resolved
were clearly relevant to issues properly before it, and both
parties had a full and fair opportunity to argue their version of
the facts and an opportunity to seek court review of any adverse
findings . 123

The importance of this exception to preclusion of federal substantive rights
by operation of state preclusion law is suggested by the fact that for a brief
time after the Court rediscovered the Ful l Faith and Credit Statute, it
appeared that the exception would operate in cases to which that statute
applied . 124 Indeed, some Justices clung to it even after its incoherence
(as a judge-made exception to preclusion) under the Court's basic approach

in circumstances that, had they been thinking of p reclusion law, the legislators who created those rights,
could not possibly have imagined ."); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 1 3 1 , 1 47 n . 4 ( 1 988) ("The fact that
Congress saw no need to alter these neutral p rocedural rules in no way suggests that all future state
court procedures . . . would similarly be consistent with the purposes and intent of the federal civil
rights Jaws . " (emphasis in original)).

12 1 . Burbank, supra note 9, at 820 (final emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
122. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 3 8 4 U.S. 394, 422 ( 1 966) .
123 . /d.

124. See, e.g. , Allen v. McCurry, 449 U . S . 90, 1 0 1 ( 1 980) .
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to the statute (positing a congressional choice of state preclusion law)
should have been clear.125
No "further inquiry" 126 should be necessary to prevent the applica
tion of state preclusion law that would foreclose the assertion of federal
sub stantive rights as a result of state administrative proceedings in which
the party asserting those rights lacked, according to federal standards, a full
and fair opportunity to litigate. The Rules of Decision Act should not be
interpreted " in a crabbed or wooden fashion . " 1 27 And if we do not so
interpret it, the federal statute under which the rights are asserted requires
otherwise than that the state preclusion rule apply.
In cases following Elliott the hardest task may be to persuade the
court that " an adequate opportunity to litigate" or a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate includes more than is minimally required by due
The Court in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.
proces s . 128
equated the two, but it did so in response to the (erroneous) view that
section 1 738 chooses domestic state preclusion law, a congressional choice
that would be binding unless unconstitutional or superseded by another
legislative choice (i. e. , repeal) . 1 29 In cases like Elliott, section 1738 does
not apply, and the plaintiff should seek all of the protections of trans
substantive federal preclusion law, which draws heavily on the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments . 130 Of course, defendants will urge the court to
follow Kremer in this aspect. 13 1
IV.

Federal Judgments Law in International Cases

A.

Sources of A uthority i n General

Although neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution nor its implementing statute applies to the judgments of
foreign tribunals,132 there can be no doubt about the existence of federal
lawmaking competence to define the circumstances in which, and the
criteria by which , foreign judgments will be recognized and enforced in
this country. Legislative competence may be found in Congress's power
1 25. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S . 306, 3 1 3 (1 983); Burbank, supra note 9, at 8 1 4.

1 26. See supra text accompanying note 1 2 1 .
1 27. Robertson v . Wegmann, 436 U .S. 584, 598 (1 978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) .
1 2 8 . See Kirkland v. City of Peekskill, 651 F. Supp. 1 225, 1 230 (S .D.N.Y.), aff'd, 828 F.2d 1 04
(2d Cir. 1 987); infra note 1 3 1 .
1 29. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U . S . 461 , 480-82 ( 1 982).
1 3 0 . See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 3 30-3 1 nn. 1 3 - 1 6 ( 1 979).
1 3 1 . Plaintiffs are not immune to confusion on this score, with predictably bad effects. See Layne
v. Campbell County Dep't of Social Servs. , 939 F.2d 2 1 7 , 2 1 9-20 (4th Cir. 1 99 1 ) (upholding dismissal
of the claims of a plaintiff who mistakenly equated adequate opportunity to litigate with due process) .
1 32 . The Full Faith and Credit Clause is restricted to "the Judicial Proceedings of every other
State. " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. The statute is restricted to "judicial proceedings of any court of any
such State." 28 U.S. C. § 1 73 8 ( 1 988).
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to " regulate Commerce with foreign Nations "133 or to "make all L aws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution"1 34 the
Executive's powers in the conduct of foreign affairs.135 Congress
rarely exercised its power in this domain, however. Indeed, perh aps the'
most prominent example of legislation in the area is the amendments to the
Federal Arbitration Act136 enacted in aid of the Convention on the ·
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards , popularly .
referred to as the New York Convention.137
In default of federal legislation, much of the energy to create
uniform federal law o n the recognition and enforcement of foreign-court
judgments has centered on treaties . The United States, however, is not
now a party to any unilateral or bilateral conventions dealing expres sly
with that subject. 1 38 At least for a time, this was not for lack of effort.
Particularly when it became clear how badly U . S . nationals might fare as
a result of discriminatory recognition provisions agreed to in the B russels
Convention139 by the members of the European Economic Community,
we sought to take advantage of the opportunity to escape those provisions
by negotiating bilateral conventions . 140 The effort started and ended with
the United Kingdom141-from a comparative-law perspective our most
likely treaty partner. The enterprise seems to have foundered largely on
disagreements about both legislative jurisdiction (particularly the extraterri-

·

·

1 3 3 . U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 .
1 3 4 . Id. art. I , § 8 , cl. 1 8 .

1 3 5 . See id. art. II , § 2 ; cf. Verlinden B . V . v . Central Bank of Nigeria, 4 6 1 U . S . 480, 493 ( 1 983)
("By reason of its authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations, Congress has the undisputed
power to decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and under what circumsumces foreign nations
should be amenable to suit in the United States . ") .

1 3 6 . Pub. L . N o . 9 1 -3 68, § 1 , 8 4 Stat. 692 (codified a t 9 U . S . C . § § 1 - 1 4 ( 1 988)).
137. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1 958,
2 1 U . S .T. 25 1 7 , 494 U . N .T.S. 3 2 1 [hereinafter New York Convention] .

1 3 8 . See BORN & WESTIN , supra note 1 , at 564; EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT

OF LAWS § 24.39 ( 1 982); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition of United States Judgments Abroad and
Foreign Judgments in the U nited States : Would International Conventions b e U seful? 4-6 (Apr. 1 9 9 1)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with

Texas Law Review) .

1 3 9 . Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 1 972 J . O . (L 299) 32.

1 40 . See PETER BYRNE, THE EEC CONVENTION ON JURJSDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT O F
JUDGMENTS 26-27, 1 78-79 (1 990); Robert B. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the

United States, 1 7 VA. J. INT'L L . 40 1 , 4 1 3 - 1 4 (1 977); Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Common Market
Judgments Convention and a Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L .
REV. 1 282, 1 289-9 1 ( 1 969) .

1 4 1 . See Mary A. Alford, Comment, The Effect of the Proposed U. S. - U. K. Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments Treaty on Current Recognition Practice in the United
States, 1 8 COLU M . J. TRANSNAT ' L L. 1 1 9 , 1 1 9 ( 1 979) (noting that the proposed recognition treaty was
the first of its kind for the U . S . ) ; see generally Hans Smit, The Proposed United States- United
Kingdom Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Prototype for the Future ? 1 7
VA. J . lNT'L L . 443 (1 977) .
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torial reach of United States antitrust law), and adjudicatory jurisdiction
(p articularly in product liability cases) . 142
Although obviously an occasion for discouragement, the failure to
conclude a treaty with the United Kingdom143 is not grounds for despair.
The incentives for a renewed effort have increased with the extension of
the B russels Convention to the member states of the European Free Trade
Association. 144 A recent paper by Professor von Mehren suggests that
revisiting the subject may lead to fruitful avenues of compromise. 1 45 The
main question may, therefore, be one of political will .
In the absence of federal legislation and treaties , the only possible
foundation for a federal solution to the problems of recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is federal common law . 146 And,
indeed, some commentators have suggested that the political will needed
might be furnished by the federal judiciary. 1 47 In arguing for uniform
judge-made rules, these commentators have, I believe, both misappre
hended the nature of the problem and miscalculated the power of the
federal courts to solve it.

1 42 .

See P . M . North , The Draft U. K./U.S. Judgments Convention: A British Viewpoint, 1 Nw.

J. INT'L L . & Bus. 2 1 9 , 228-39 ( 1 979) .
1 43 .

See von Mehren, supra note 1 40 , at 4 1 3 (noting that, although initialed, the U . S . -U.K.

Convention had not been submitted to the Senate for ratification) .
1 44 . See BYRNE, supra note 1 40 , at 8; Michael J. Bonell, Harmonization of Law Between Civil

and Common Law Jurisdictions: The 1968 Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention-An
Example to Follow, in ITALIAN NATIONAL REPORTS

TO

THE XffiTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF

COMPARATIVE LAW 70, 85-86 ( 1 990).
1 45 . See von Mehren, supra note 1 3 8 , at 1 4- 1 9 ; see also Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of
Foreign-Money Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance,
67 N OTRE DAME L. REV. 253 , 327-28 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .

Professor Brand makes the interesting point that

changes in the nature of international arbitration, procedural and sub stantive, coupled with experience
under the New York Convention, see supra text accompanying note 1 37 , may have improved the
climate for a multilateral treaty.

See Brand, supra , at 292-95.

towards the extraterritorial application of U . S . laws.
146.

He also notes changes in attitudes

See id. at 295-96.

Professor Brand's recent suggestion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could provide

uniform federal law on this subj ect for the federal courts, see Brand, supra note 1 4 5 , at 3 1 9-22, is a
non-starter.

The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U . S . C . § 2072 ( 1 988) , does not authorize rules of this type.

See Burbank, supra note 9, at 772-73 .
1 47 .

See, e.g. , Brand, supra note 1 45 , at 3 00- 1 8 ; John N . Moore, Federalism and Foreign

Relations, 1 965 DUKE L . J . 248 , 26 1 -68, 285-86; Willis L . M . Reese, The Status in This Country of
Judgments Rendered A broad, 50 COLUM. L. RE v . 783 , 786-38 ( 1 950); Eugene F . Scoles, Interstate

and International Distinctions in Conflict ofLaws in the United States , 54 CAL. L. REV . 1 599, 1 602..{)7
( 1 966); John D. Brununett, Jr. , Note, T1ze Preclusive Effect of Foreign- Country Judgments in the

United States and Federal Choice of Law: The Role of the Erie Doctrine Reassessed, 33 N . Y . L . ScH.

L . REV. 8 3 , 1 09 ( 1 988); Albert A . Lindner, Comment, Judgments Rendered Abroad-State Law or

Federal Law?, 1 2 VILL. L . REv. 6 1 8 , 630 ( 1 967); Raymond P. Marks, Note, Alternative Theories for
Establishing a Federal Common

Law of Foreign Judgments in

Commercial Cases: The Foreign Affairs

Power and the Donnant Foreign Commerce Clause, 1 6 VA . J. INT'L L. 635, 660 ( 1 976) .
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Federal Common Law: Practical Considerations

Hilton v. Guyot148 represents the best of federal general common
law, if not of opinion-writing. Here, after all , was the Supreme Court, in
an exhaustive (and exhaustingY49 opinion that collected authority
wherever it might be found, settling a question that h ad vexed our courts
for decades-indeed, since we became a country : what, if any, respect is
due the judicial proceedings of the courts of another country?
And , length and prolixity aside, what a grand statement the Court's
opinion in Hilton was . The modern reader may remember only the
requirement of reciprocity-do unto others as they would do unto you . Yet
even as to that, the Court was less grudging than is sometimes recog
nized . 1 50 Putting reciprocity to the side, the Court in Hilton-in 1 89 5 be
it recalled-essentially said that foreign judgments should be treated as if
they issued from courts of neighboring states-as if they were entitled to
full faith and credit. 1 5 1
Did I say that Hilton v. Guyot settled the question of the respect due
to foreign judgments? That is notoriously not true as to sources of
authority. 152 But the case has been a fertile source of rules, leading to
the substantial measure of uniformity153 that was the great hope, oft
defeated, of the author of Swift v. Tyson. 1 54 For Hilton was decided in
what Paul Freund called "that spacious era before the Erie case, when
federal judges in diversity cases were more than echoes of h alf-heard
whispers of the state tribunals. " 1 55 Since Erie ushered in dual revolu-

148.

159 u.s. 1 1 3 (1 895) .

1 4 9 . The statement of the case occupies more than nine pages, id. at 1 1 4-23 , the arguments of
counsel some forty pages, id. at 1 23 -62, the Court's opinion sixty-seven pages, id. at 1 62-229, and the
dissent a mere six pages, id. at 229-34.

See id. at 2 1 0-29; Reese, supra note 1 47 , at 790-92 .
See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What
to Do About It, 42 IOWA L. REV. 236, 240-4 1 ( 1 957) .
1 52 . See Reese, supra note 1 47 , at 786-88 .
! 5 3 . See BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 1 , at 565 (noting that " [m]ost state courts have adopted the
basic approach to foreign judgments taken almost a century ago in Hilton v. Guyot"); R. Doak Bishop
& Susan Burnette, United States Practice Concerning the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 16 lNT'L
LAW. 425, 430 ( 1 982) (noting that "the Hilton language still remains the predominant statement of the
1 50 .
151 .

elements which must ex.ist before a foreign-country judgment will be re�,;ognized in the U nited States");

supra note 145, at 2 6 1 -62, 265-66 (noting extensive reliance on Hilton in decisions, statutes,
Restatements) . Compare von Mehren, supra note 1 3 8 , at 1 1 (observing the "sub stantial unity that,

Brand,
and

despite its federal character, United States recognition practice today exhibits") with id. at 9 (stating
that "the Jaw of recognition and enforcement varies in significant details from state to state" (footnote
omitted)) .
154.

41 U . S . ( 1 6 Pet.) I (1 842) (Story, J.);

see also Erie R . R . v. Tompkins, 304 U . S . 64, 74
v. Tyson had revealed its defects, political and

( 1 93 8) (" Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift

social; and the b enefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue. ") .
1 5 5 . Paul A. F;eu nd,

(1 946) .

ChiefJustice Stone and the Conflict oflAws,

59 HARV . L . REv. 1 2 1 0 , ! 2 1 2
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tions /56 there has been near unanimity among courts that, in the absence
of a treaty or federal statute, the states are free to define for themselves the
standards to use in recognizing foreign judgments , and that federal courts
sitting to administer state law in diversity are bound to follow those stan
dards . 157 In doing so, however, whether in cases or statutes, the states
have largely adopted the basic rules announced in Hilton, except that most
of them have refused to follow the requirement of reciprocity. 1 5 8 I
believe that the resulting relatively high degree of homogeneity in
fundamental domestic rules helps explain why arguments by commentators
favoring uniform and uniformly applicable federal rules 1 59 have fared so
poorly. Thus, as a relic of general federal common law Hilton may also
be a derelict, 1 60 but it is a relatively harmless one. The main problem
posed by our law of recognition in international cases may not be content
but form, and the main problem of national interest in such cases may not
in any event be our law of recognition.
It is one thing to conclude from an analysis of the relevant legal
materials that United States law is substantially uniform in fundamental
rules and quite another to persuade a foreign court seeking to apply a
reciprocity requirement of the truth of that proposition, or for that matter
of any other proposition about law found in cases . 161 We should not be
so far removed from our own debates about codification of the law 1 62 that
we cannot understand the skepticism of courts accustomed to codified law
when confronted with arguments �as�gn case law from one of fifty-one
lawmaking jurisdictions . Indeed, we are not so far removed, for percep-

1 56 .

See Henry J.

Friendly,

In Praise ofEri e-And of the New Federal Common Law,

39 N . Y . U .

L. REV. 3 8 3 , 422 (1 964) ("The complementary concepts-that federal courts must follow state
decisions on matters of sub stantive law appropriately cognizable by the states whereas state courts must
follow federal decisions on subj ects within national legislative power where congress has so d irected
seems so beautifully simple, and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder why a century and a half
were needed to di scover them . . . . ) .
"

1 57 . See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 48 1

cmt. a ( 1 987) ("Thus, State courts, and federal courts applying State law, recognize and enforce foreign
country judgments without reference to federal rules . ") .
158.

See id. § 48 1

cmt. d (observing that the reciprocity requirement " i s n o longer followed in

the great majority of state and federal courts in the United States" ) ; Frederich K. Juenger,

The
Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 36 AM . J. COMP. L. 1 , 33 ( 1 988)
(noting that the rule of reciprocity announced in Hilton v. Guyot "is b ecoming obsolete " ) . The
rejection of reciprocity, however. has not been universa l . See Brand, supra note 145, at 263-65.
! 59 . See supra note 1 47 and accompanying text.
1 60 . See supra text accompanying notes 27-2 8 .
1 6 1 . See Brand, supra note 1 45 , a t 256 , 287; Adolph Hamburger, Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments: A New Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 1 8 AM . J. COMP. L. 367, 369-70
( 1 970) ; Nadelmann, supra note 1 5 1 , at 25 1 -5 7 ; Behrooz Moghaddam, Note, Recognition of Foreign
Country Judgments-A Case for Federalization, 22 TEX. lNT ' L L. J. 33 1 , 346 ( 1 987) .
1 62 . See generally Cf.L>\RLES M . COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT (198 1 ) .

1 576

[Vol . 70 : 1 55 1

Texas Law Review

tion of the problem was an important influence in the movement for
uniform state recognition and enforcement legislation.163
The inadequacy of uniform federal judge-made rules in this area
would not be limited to matters of form.164 As this country's experience
in attempting to work out an acceptable treaty with the U nited Kingdom
demonstrates, even countries sharing a legal tradition can be deeply divided
on matters of legislative jurisdiction and substantive policy, and these
divisions, as well as differences concerning standards of adjudicatory
jurisdiction, can prevent accord on standards for recognition and enforce
ment. 1 65 Uniform domestic law could not bridge those divides unless it
waved a white flag of surrender166 or were the product of an international
lawmaking effort capable of forging compromises in a way that unilateral
lawmaking is not. 167
The widespread rejection of reciprocity in this country since Hilton
v. Guyot may reflect the perceived institutional incapacity of courts to
engage in the sort of give and take that will be necessary to solve the
problems of judgment recognition and enforcement in international
cases . 1 68 And from that perspective, there is irony in reliance on the
decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatind69 by those who

1 63 . See Hamburger, supra note 1 6 1 , at 3 69 ; Barbara Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country
Judgments in New York: The Unifonn Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 1 8 BUFF. L. REv.
1 , 1 ( 1 969); Nadelmann, supra note 1 5 1 , at 258-5 9 . Unfortunately, substantial u niformity has eluded
u s . See Brand, supra note 1 45 , at 283 .
1 64 . To be sure, uniform case law would be better than nonuniform case law. See von Mehren,
supra note 1 40, at 408 .
1 6 5 . See Nadel mann, supra note 1 5 1 , a t 260-62; supra text accompanying notes 1 4 1 -42; cf.
Burbank, supra note 1 , at 1 465-66 ("In many cases, the real problems are not those of legislative
jurisdiction; they are problems involving disagreement on matters of sub stantive law and state policy . " ) .
1 66 .

Complete surrender would b e impossible if, for instance, recognition a n d enforcement o f a

foreign judgment would violate due process.

See

Reese,

supra

note 1 47 , at 796; von Mehren,

supra

note 1 3 8 , at 1 5 . Moreover, surrender on standards of recognition and enforcement would likely result
in a lowest common denominator, the uniformity of which being the best thing one could say about it.
1 67 .
1 68 .

See
See

Burbank,

supra

note 1 , at 1 49 6 .

Hilton v. Guyot, 1 59 U . S . 1 1 3 , 23 4 ( 1 895) ( Fuller, C .J . , dissenting) ( " [I] t is for the

government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion, if deemed under any
circumstances desirabl e or necessary . " ) ; cf. Patrick J. Borchers,

Grail,

Professor Brilmayer and the Holy

1 99 1 WIS. L . REv. 465, 480 (reviewing LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT O F LAWS: FOUNDATIONS

AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS ( 1 99 1 )) (" 'Tit for Tat' may be an acceptable game strategy, but it hardly
seems like a way to decide real lawsuits involving real parties.
public confidence in the court s . " ) ; Burbank,

supra

Certainly it is not likely to inspire

note 1 , at 1 480 (noting the danger that a court

interpreting a treaty will "compromise the ability of those primarily charged with the conduct of foreign
relations effectively to implement our national interests through dialogue wit.'1 other nations") ; Laker
Airways Ltd . v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 73 1 F.2d 9{)9, 948-52 (D . C . Cir. 1 984) (rej ecting

interest balancing in determining prescriptive jurisdiction) . But

see

Moore, supra note 1 47 , at 255-56

(arguing that state rej ections of reciprocity lead to the result that "judgments of other nations are largely
enforced in this countr;, while our judgments are not enforced in foreign courts") .
1 69 .

376 u . s . 3 98 ( 1 964).
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advocate uniform federal judge-made rules . 17° For Sabbatino is best
regarded not as authority for an expansive federal common law of foreign
affairs but rather for the power of the federal judiciary to make uniformly
applicable rules (the act-of-state doctrine) designed to protect courts from
entanglements in, and interbranch conflicts about, matters for which they
are not institutionally suited . 171 Indeed, the Court in Sabbatino also
refused to extend the reciprocity of Hilton v. Guyot "to the question of
standing of sovereign states to sue, "172 observing that courts' "powers to
further the national interest in foreign affairs are necessarily circumscribed
as compared with those of the political branches . " 173
Federal Common Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules

C.

How far, then, could federal common law extend in governing the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments? The broadest sweep for
federal judge-made law would involve uniform rules binding in all cases
in federal and state court alike. The narrowest would find state law
governing in all cases , no matter what the court, except where a particular
state rule was recognized to be hostile to or inconsistent with federal
interests . The former is too broad and the latter too narrow. The truth lies
somewhere in the middle, very close to what I take to be the law today.
I have already suggested a difficulty in regarding Sabbatino as
authority for an expansive federal common law of foreign affairs.174 It
is not that the Court eschewed the most obvious peg upon which to hang
federal judicial authority when it denied that the act-of-state doctrine was
required by the "text of the Constitution. "175 The Court seems there to
have been denying that the Constitution was the source of a particular rule
("irrevocably remov[ing] from the judiciary the capacity to review the

1 70 .

See Moore, supra note 1 47 , at 269-70, 273-75.
See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424-25; Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal
Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 805, 8 1 4- 1 9 , 830-32 ( 1 964); see also Alfred Hill, The lAw
Making Power of the Federal Couns: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1 024, 1056-57,
171.

1 064 n . l 94 ( 1 967) (suggesting that avoiding exacerbation of foreign relations is a basis for federal
judicial control, but that policy alone is too broad and vague to define the range of exclusive federal
competence) ; Andreas F. Lowenfeld,

Act of State and Depanment of State:

First National City Bank

v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 795 ( 1 972) (� [W]hen the judiciary of its own accord
sets limits to its adjudicatory role, neither of the other b ranches of government-let alone b oth-should

try to expand those limits . ") .

For recent criticism of

Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J.
1 72 . Sabbatino, 376 U . S . a t 4 1 2 .
1 7 3 . !d.
1 7 4 . See supra text accompanying note 1 7 1 .
1 75 . Sabbatino, 376 U . S . at 423 . Specifically,

Sabbatino's

restraint, see Harold H. Koh,

2347, 2362-64, 2377 ( 1 9 9 1 ) .

the Court held that "the text of the Constitution

does not require L�e act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity

to review the valid it; of foreign acts of state . " !d.
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validity of foreign acts of state" 176), not that it was a source of authority
for judge-made law . 1 77 Even if, however, the Constitution plausibly
requires uniformity as to acts of state, a doctrine described by the Court in
Sabbatino as "concern[ing] the competency of dissimilar institutions to
make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of inter
national relations , " 178 the requirement of uniformity does not auto
matically extend to other areas in which " international relations " may be
implicated . 1 79 Other Supreme Court decisions that tend to be cited in
support of broad common-law powers are even less helpful , either because
they involved past federal executive action with which state law could be
deemed inconsistene 80 or because state law, on its face or as applied, was
so intrusive as to threaten the future ability of the federal executive to
perform its constitutional functions properly. 1 8 1
Because the fundamental rules in most states, judge-made or
statutory, derive from Hilton v. Guyot, 1 82 if there are serious risks of

1 76.
1 77 .

!d.
See id.

("The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitutional' underpinning s . " ) ; id.

at 427 & n.25 (noting that various p rovisions of the Constitution support determining the scope of the
act-of-state doctrine according to federal law by "reflecting a concern for uniformity" in foreign
relations and " indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of
federal institutions").
178.

at 423 . In fact, the Court left open " whether a state court might, i n certain circumstanc

!d.

es, adhere to a more restrictive view concerning the scope of examination of foreign acts than that
required by this Court."
1 79.

In

!d.

at 425 n.23 .

asserting, as well as denying, federal authority, we should not address "a valid concern"

with "an overcompensating blanket rule."
1 80 .

See

Koh,

supra

note 1 7 1 , at 2382.

United States v. Pink, 3 1 5 U.S. 203 , 223 ( 1 942); United States v . Belmont, 3 0 1 U . S .

324, 3 2 7 (1 937) (both holding that a n agreement between t h e Soviet Union a n d the United States, i n
which all claims held b y the Soviet Union against American nationals were assigned t o the United
States, could not be infringed upon by any policy of the State of New York because "no state policy
can prevail against the international compact here involved" ) .
181.

See

Zschernig v . Miller, 3 89 U . S . 429, 4 4 1 ( 1 968) ( holding a n Oregon p robate law that

provided for " escheat where a nonresident alien claims personalty unless . . . there is a reciprocal right
of

a

United States citizen to take property on the same terms as the citizen in a foreign nation"

unconstirutional as applied because "it has a direct impact upon foreign relations and may well
adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with . . . them").

autlwr of the Court's opinion in

Sabbatino,

observed in his concurring opinion in

As Justice Harlan,

Zschemig:

If the flaw in the statute is said to be that it requires state courts to inquire
into the administration of foreign law, I would suggest that that characteristic is
shared by other legal rules which I cannot b elieve the Court wishes to invalidate.
For example, the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act provides that

a
a

!d.

at

foreign-country money judgment shall not be recognized if it �was rendered under
system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with

the requirements of due process of law . "
4 6 1 ('rt arlan, J. , concurring).

For an argument that

"Zschemig's

incompleteness is n o reason

for converting its curb on state law into a presumption in favor of federal law , " see James A . R .
Nafziger,

State Law in lntenUJtional Cases, in

1 990 AJ..! . Soc'Y L'lT ' L L . PROC. 332, 3 3 5 .

penetrating analysis of Zschemig, see Harold G. Maier,

in Private lntenUJtional Matters,
1 82 .

1 59 U . S . 1 1 3 ( 1 895) .

5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT ' L L. 1 3 3 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .

See supra

For

a

The Bases and Range of Federal Common LAw

text accompanying notes 1 5 3 , ! 5 8 .
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disruption, they likely have a federal Gudicial) source. Moreover, as
others have observed, 1 83 the lead candidate for federal displacement
would be the requirement of reciprocity that most states have already re
jected . 184 Other inquiries under state recognition law that could prove
embarrassing in the conduct of the nation's foreign relations seem rarely,
if ever, of consequence. 1 85
Thus , assuming that the Constitution's foreign relations or foreign
trade powers, without more, could ground uniform judge-made rules of
recognition and enforcement, 1 86 a showing could not be made, at least
under most of the Court's recent federal common-law decisions, 1 87 to
support uniform rules as opposed to state law borrowed as federal law
except where hostile to or inconsistent with federal interests . 188
The power to displace state law rules exists in cases brought in both
federal and state court, although , as we have seen, it is hard to speak of the
state law rules of recognition and enforcement that are normally applicable
in state court as " really federal law. "1 89 Under an approach to federal
common law that takes the Rules of Decision Act seriously, the difficulty
w ith the notion of judicial borrowing is no less in cases brought in federal
court, where that statute cannot simply be wished away. 1ro
If that were all , we would be left with the federal common-law
regime of narrowest scope described above. 191 But that is not all, or so

1 8 3 . See, e.g. , Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States, 6 LAW & PoL'Y INT ' L Bus. 3 7 , 48 n . 5 5 ( 1 974) ;
Hamburger, supra note 1 6 1 , at 3 8 1 -9 1 .
1 84 . See supra text accompanying note 1 5 8 . For expressed doubt that Zschemig even requires
states to abandon reciprocity, let alone to apply federal law, see SCOLES & HAY, supra note 1 3 8 ,

§ 2 4 . 3 5 , a t 964-65 n . 5 .
185.

See Brand, supra

note 1 45 , a t 275 (noting that considerations o f public policy may, b u t rarely

do, result in denial of recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments); Juenger,

supra

note 1 5 8 , at

22-23 (discussing the diffi culty of determining when a state may legitimately refuse to recognize

a

foreign judgment because it conflicts with important forum policies) ; id. at 36-37 (discussing judgments
from biased tribunals and p rocedures incompatible with due p rocess) .
186.
187.

See generally Maier, supra
See, e.g. , United States v .

note 1 8 1 ; Hill,

supra

note 1 7 1 .

Kimbell Foods, Inc . , 44() U . S . 7 1 5 ( 1 979) .

But see

Boyle v .

U nited Technologies Corp . , 4 8 7 U . S . 5 00 , 504 (1 988) (holding in a diversity case involving uniquely
federal interests that state Jaw is p reempted and replaced by federal common law, absent explicit
statutory directive) .

It is difficult for me to regard

Boyle

as signaling a general shift back to the

expansive approach to federal common law typified by Clearfield Trust Co.

v.

United States, 3 1 8 U . S .

See Burbank, supra note 9, a t 75 8 . The opinions reek o f teleology. See The
Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Leading Cases, 102 HAR.v . L. REV. 1 4 3 , 288-97 ( 1 988) .
1 8 8 . This is essentially the conclusion reached by Professor Peterson in a thoughtful a rticl e . See
Courtland H . Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of Conflict of lAws,
72 CO LU M . L. REv. 220, 234-38 ( 1 972); see also Homer D. S chaaf, The Recognition of Judgments
from Foreign Countries: A Federal-State Clause for an International Convention, 3 HA.'<.V . J. ON LEGIS.
363 , 366-67 ( 1 943) .

379, 395-98 ( 1 9 65-66) (discussing the reluctance of federal courts to develop federal common law in
the absence of a statutory or constitutional basis for doing so) .
189.

1 90 .
191 .

See supra
See supra
See supra

text accompanying note 53 .
text accompanying notes 5 1 -53 .
paragraph preceding note 1 74 .
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courts and commentators seem to think, without bothering to explain why .
In cases involving the recognition of foreign judgments that are both
brought in federal court and brought under federal substantive law, the
tendency has been to look directly to federal law, or at least not to mention
state law . 1 92
As we have seen, under traditional federal common-law analysis, the
question whether a federal substantive claim is precluded by prior
proceedings is a question as to which federal lawmaking competence exists
no matter what the rendering forum. 193 This includes a foreign forum .
I t would b e ironic to invoke the homogeneity o f domestic law in this area
as an argument against the use of uniform federal judge-made rules in
federal question cases . For it was , I have argued, the existence of such
uniform judge-made rules , albeit in different garb, that l argely explains the
current state of recognition law .194 Indeed, the substantial s imilarity of
federal and state rules to determine the preclusive effects of foreign
judgments seems instead an argument for permitting the federal courts, in
federal question cases, to protect federal interests directly. State interests
are negligible, and the administrability costs inherent in references to state
law, including those associated with the selection of the state whose law
was to be borrowed, would be difficult to justify. 195
Moreover, it may not be inappropriate to consider that, in addition
to protecting federal interests that underlie the p articular substantive scheme
in suit, uniform federal rules of recognition and enforcement could
safeguard the general federal interests in foreign affairs and foreign trade.
Particularly because " it is not clear that the uniformity inquiry need, or that
it should, be cabined by existing . . . law, "196 we are perhaps entitled to
rely on the general proposition that federal law is better calculated than
state law to protect federal interests ,197 or at least to do so when multiple
federal , and few discernible state, interests are implicated .

1 92 . See 1 8 CHARLES A. WRJGHT ET AL . , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4473 ( 1 9 8 1 )
("In deciding federal question cases, there is n o apparent reason t o consult state law a n d fed eral courts
routinely determine the res judicata effects of foreign judgments without any reference to state law. ");

see also von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 1 83 , at 39 ("If the issue to which a foreign judgment
relates is a federal question . . . the court . . . would apply federal law . . . . "); Eric D. Ram, Note,

Reciprocal Recognition ofForeign Country Money Judgments: The Canada- United States Example, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 456, 1 48 1 (1 977) ("If the recognition [of

a

foreign judgment] claim is ancillary

to one involving a federal question . . . the suit upon the judgment will be decided according to federal
common law . " ) .
1 93 . See supra text accompanying note 97.
194. See Burbank, supra note 9 , at 769 & n. l 68 ; supra text accompanying notes 1 52-55, 1 5 8-60.
1 95 . Cf. Burbank, supra note 9 , at 765-70 (describing costs that would be incurred if uniform
federal preclusion rules for federal question judgments of federal courts were not adopted) . I reach a
different conclusion as to the governing law in a state-court action on a federal claim. See supra text
accompanying note 3 1 .
196. Burban.� , supra note 9 , at 770 n . 1 72.
197 . Cf supra text accompanying notes 1 1 9-21 .

\
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Such reliance is, of course, more problematic under an approach to
federal common law that takes the Rules of Decision Act seriously. Yet,
to recur to the distinction suggested by Sabbatino/ 98 that statute need
not, and should not, be "interpreted to require that the precise content,
rather than the creation, of uniform federal common law rules be 'required'
by the Constitution or acts of Congress. " 1 99 On the assumption of con
tinuing substantial homogeneity as between federal and state recognition
law, the administrability costs of reference to state law might be thought
too high to justify "distinguishing between federal law on the front lines
and federal law held in reserve. "200 If, on the contrary, the analysis
contemplates either existing differences or possible changes in the law of
recognition and enforcement, federal or state, the costs of applying state
law would more often include the possible loss of federal substantive rights
and thus justify a conclusion that the federal substantive statute requires the
appl ication of uniform federal recognition law .
The case for the application o f federal judge-made rules o f
recognition and enforcement to foreign judgments i s hardly watertight even
when the issue arises in a federal question case in federal court.201 It
crumbles to dust when the case is instead a state-law diversity action. State
interests are directly impl icated, 202 as is the articulated federal interest
against different outcomes on the basis of citizenship in diversity cases . 203
Differences between state and federal law on the recognition and enforce
ment of foreign judgments could easily and materially affect "the character
or result of the litigation . "204 Moreover, such differences would be
likely to affect choice of forum, whether or not they could be characterized
as " inequitable administration of the laws . " 205 It appears that, according
to the Hanna test, state law should be applied to foreign judgments in
diversity cases . Even if the Supreme Court's approach to these problems
still permits the consideration of other federal interests,206 it is not clear
how they could tip the balance in favor of federal law. For as we have

1 98 . 376 U . S . 398 ( 1 964); see supra text accompany ing notes 1 75-7 8 .
1 99 . Burbank, supra note 9 , a t 770.
200 . Id. at 765 . I use the term " federal l aw-in-reserve" to describe federal l aw that " act[s] only
as a check against hostile or inconsistent state law." Id. at 764.
20 1 . Obviously, I do not share the view, which the Rules of Decision Act renders incoherent, that
in federal question cases " there is no apparent reason to consult state l aw . " See 1 8 WRIGHT ET AL . ,
supra note 1 92, § 4473 .
202. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 784 ( " [ W ]hereas in federal question cases state substantive
interests are usually contingent, in diversity cases, assuming the action involves the adjudication of
rights under state substanti ve l aw, state interests are directly and inescapably implicated . ").

3 80

203 . See, e.g. , W alker v . Armco Steel Corp . , 446 U . S . 740, 744-47 ( 1 980);
U . S . 460, 466-69 ( 1 965) .
204. Hanna, 3 80 U . S . at 468 n . 9 .
205 . Id. a t 4 6 8 ; see Burbank, supra note 9, a t 7 8 5 .
206. See Burbank, supra note 9, a t 788-9 1 .

Hanna v. Plumer,

1 58 2
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seen, the general federal interest in foreign affairs or foreign trade is not
sufficient to require uniform federal rules .207 In sum , Hilton v. Guyot
might be decided the same way in 1 995 as it was in 1 895-although that
seems unlikely with respect to the question of reciprocity208-but not
because it reflects an enduring source of authority. 209
D.

Legal Sources: Additional Complexities

Whatever the governing recognition law in our courts , federal or
state, and whatever the source of the rules provided by that law, the rules
themselves may, at key points , require reference to foreign law . The
extent to which such references are appropriate is a difficult issue, but one
that has occupied scholars more than courts . 210 The same is true regard
ing the issue of exactly what law or standards should be consulted when a
reference to "domestic law " is required or appropriate. 211 Treaties could
answer these questions , but we should not hold our breath .212 I conclude
by offering a few preliminary thoughts about this last interesting but
relatively neglected set of questions .
Much ink has been spilled on the reasons for recognizing and
enforcing foreign judgments .213 At various times in our history, lacking
direction from positive law, courts have sought to justify their positions in
the felt necessities of conflicts theory or in the mists of comity. 214 More
recently, commentators have focused attention on the relevance to foreign
judgment recognition practice of the policies underlying domestic law.21 5

See supra text accompanying notes 1 74-90 .
See supra text accompanying note 1 6 8 .
209. Reciprocity aside,Hilton might b e decided the same way i n 1 995 because the 1 895 decision
has proved such a "fertile source of rules" for the states. See supra text accompanying note 1 53 . State
207.

208 .

law would now be applicable under the Rules of Decision Act.
2 1 0 . See Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgmems: Whose Law?, 70
IOWA L. REv. 53 , 54-58 ( 1 984); Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 , at 1 4- 1 8 , 20-2 1 ; Peterson, supra note 1 88 ,
a t 259-64; Arthur T . von Mehren & Donald T . Trautman , Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A

Survey and Suggested Approach, 8 1 HARV. L. REv. 1 60 1 , 1 6 1 1 -24, 1 673-95 ( 1 968) .
2 1 1 . See Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 , at 1 5 (describing the "mirror-image principle , " under which

"countries measure[] the foreign court's j urisdiction by reference to the bases found in their own
laws").
2 1 2 . See supra text accompanying notes 1 3 8-45 .

See, e.g. , Casad, supra note 2 1 0 , at 58-6 1 ; P ete r so n , supra note 1 8 3 , at 23 9-48; Courtland
Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 1 , 299-308 ( 1 963 ) ;
Reese, supra note 1 47 , at 7 8 3 - 8 6 ; Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in
the United States, 9 UCLA L. REv. 44, 52-56 ( 1 962) ; von Mehren & Trau tma n , supra note 2 1 0 , at
213.

H. Peterson,

1 602-06 .
214.

See Reese, supra note

1 47 , at 784 (noting that the doctrine of "comityn is often used by

American courts to justifY recognition of foreign judgments while English courts p refer the d oc trine
of "legal obligations of foreign judgments"); Smit, supra note 2 1 3 , at 52-55 (observing tl1at comity has
b een invoked frequently because of its convenient vagueness).
2 1 5 . See Smit, supra note 2 1 3 , at 56; Reese, supra note 1 47, at 7 8 4 .
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Major differences of opinion have emerged depending upon whether those
policies are not only weighed, but also defined, from an interjurisdictional
perspective, or in other words , whether the relevant " domestic law " is that
governing intrastate cases or that governing interstate cases . 216
Granting the inadequate explanatory power of comity,217 it does
suggest a policy of accommodation. We may be required to re-rationalize
Hilton v. Guyot, 21 8 but we are probably not free to ignore it. The
advancement of intramural preclusion policies did not exhaust the Supreme
Court's agenda in that case,219 and, reciprocity aside, it is difficult to
believe that the Court would stop there today. 220 More generally, it
hardly seems a plausible normative posture today that "the principles
underlying the doctrine of res judicata provide the only logical and
satisfactory explanation for recognition of foreign judgments . "221

2 1 6 . Compare Smit, supra note 2 1 3 , at 56 (rejecting interstate perspective) with Peterson, supra
note 2 1 3 , at 302-08 (embracing interstate perspective) . See Casad, supra note 2 1 0 , at 59-60.
Elaborating his views on the appropriate policy analysis, Professor Peterson writes:
Several conclusions may be drawn at this point. First, it is apparent that new
policy factors appear when the res judicata doctrine is lifted from its domestic
context and applied to nondomestic judgments . If we truly wish to account for
these factors in a policy-oriented approach to the problem of foreign-country
judgments, however, we must be prepared to account for those policies which
strengthen the res judicata rationale as well as for those which weaken it. Two such
strengthening factors have been described as the ordering principle and the policy
of finality for American judgments raised abroad. These policies complement the

policy of ending litigation, which may still be regarded as the basic ingredient of
the res judicata rationale.
Peterson, supra note 2 1 3 , at 307; see also Peterson, supra note 1 8 8 , at 24{) (defending the interstate
perspective) .
Professor Peterson's approach has won the day, at least in the literature. See Casad, supra
note 2 1 0, at 58-6 1 ; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2 10 , at 1 603-06; Arthur T. von Mehren,

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments-General Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional
Requirements, 1 67 RECUEIL DES COURS D' ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9, 20-54 ( 1 980) .
2 1 7 . See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2 1 0 , at 1 603 (describing "comity" as a "general
mode of expression that at most expresses an attitude or disposition") .
2 1 8 . See supra text accompanying notes 1 52-60, 20 1 -0 9 .
2 1 9 . See Hilton v. Guyot, 1 59 U.S. 1 1 3 , 1 63-64, 2 1 0-28 ( 1 895) .
220 . See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S . 1 02 , 1 1 5 (1 987) (holding that a court,
in determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant, must "consider the
procedures and substantive policies of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of
jurisdiction by [an American] court" (emphasis in original)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U . S . 6 1 4 , 629 ( 1 985) (noting that courts should consider "concerns of
international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals and sensitivity to
the need of the international commercial system for p redictability in the resolution of disputes"); Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 4 1 7 U.S. 506, 5 1 6- 1 7 ( 1 974) (stating that the refusal to enforce an international
arbitration agreement "would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties" that
would "damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability
of businessmen to enter into international commercial agreements"); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore

Co., 407 U . S . 1 , 9 (1 972) ("We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international

waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts . ") .
22 1 . Smit, supra note 2 1 3 , at 56.
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Just as the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute
do not hold a monopoly on federalism values in this country/22 even les s
do they hold a worldwide monopoly on law as an instrument of cooperation
and unification . Hilton v. Guyot was distinctive in part because, apart from
the requirement of reciprocity, it cut against the deep grain of American
isolationism.223 Those who would ignore foreign law and policy in the
recognition area are in reality calling for a return to isolationism.224
To be sure, shaping our law of recognition of foreign judgments so
as , among other things, to enhance international cooperation does not
require, were it possible, replicating the particular method of achieving
national unity that Congress selected in the Full Faith and Credit
Statute.225 It is, however, difficult to imagine a system that is concerned
about international accommodation but makes no references to foreign law .
There are, in any event, good reasons not to replicate interstate
recognition practice in the international arena.
Whether or not the
substantial theoretical attraction of requiring strict compliance w ith the
rendering court's jurisdictional standards226 is thought to j ustify the costs
of policing compliance with foreign law,227 it would be very difficult to
defend a regime of preclusion for jurisdictional findings in foreign
judgment cases identical to the regime that has evolved in interstate
cases . 228 Even if we are willing to abide by the foreign tribunal 's factual
findings ,229 there should be some opportunity to test whether that tri-

222 .

See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 4- 1 6 .
See Harry L . Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 5 1 5 , 556-62 ( 1 953); Kurt H . Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague
Conference on Private InternationalLaw, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 1 , 29 1 -304 ( 1 965); Peterson,
supra note 2 1 3 , at 299.
224. See Smit, supra note 2 1 3 , at 75; Hans Smit, International Res Judicata in the Netherlands:
A Comparative Analysis, 1 6 BUFF. L . REv. 1 65 , 1 7 6 n . 63 ( 1 966). This is not Professor Smit's only
such call . See Burbank, supra note 1 , at 1 482 & n . 1 5 1 , 1 483 n . 1 53 , 1 4 8 6 n . 1 77 , 1 49 1 n . 20 8 .
225. See supra text accompanying note 9 ; supra note 1 5 .
226. See Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 , a t 1 7 n . 6 5 ( " [T)here is Supreme Court authority which suggests
223 .

that the recognition state may refuse to honor the judgment of a sister-state court that lacked
'jurisdiction , ' not under constitutional standards but solely pursuant to its own law . " (citing Treinies
v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U . S . 66 ( 1 939))); von Mehren & Trautman,

supra

note 2 1 0 , at 1 6 1 0 ,

1 623 , 1 627-28 (discussing the "hallmark" function of t h e jurisdictional test for determining whether
to recognize a foreign judgment) .
227.
228 .

See
See

Juenger,

supra

note 1 58 , at 1 6- 1 8 .

Sherrer v . Sherrer, 3 3 4 U . S . 3 43 , 356 (1 948) (barring a collateral attack o n a divorce

decree where the defendant had an opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues) ; American Sur. Co.
v. Baldwin, 287 U . S . 1 56, 1 66-67 ( 1 932) (holding that a prior action in state court barred a subsequent
suit in ferleral court seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the prior judgment for want of jurisdiction);
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U . S . 522, 525-27 ( 1 93 1 ) (ruling that a defendant's
special appearance in federal court barred the defense of want of jurisdiction in a subsequent federal
suit upon the judgment) .
229.

But see

von Mehren & Trautman,

supra

note 2 1 0 , at 1 627 ( " [T]he rendering court

assume jurisdiction on the basis of lax or dishonest fact finding in

a

can

contested p roceeding as well as
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bunal 's assertion of authority to adjudicate was fundamentally fair by
domestic standards . 230
If the question is not jurisdiction but rather the scope of preclusive
effects , there is better reason to adhere to the law of the rendering court.
In international cases as in interstate cases , the answer to the question
whether a recognizing court can or should give the rendering court's
j udgments greater preclusive effects than they would have at home depends
upon pol icy focus .

Those who see in ful l faith and credit or foreign

j udgment recognition practice only the pol icies of intrastate preclusion l aw
are not likely to b al k at giving either interstate or foreign judgments greater
preclusive effect than they have at home. 231

After all , if the recognizing

j urisdiction's l aw cal l s for preclusion, the shared goal of putting an end to
l itigation w il l be served,

and the rendering j urisdiction will have no

complaint. 232
The argument is short-sighted . A rule of greater preclusive effects ,
once known, cou l d have a consequential impact on the conduct of the
initial l itigation, as risk-averse parties treat what should have been a local
skirmish as if it were a world war. 233

This escalation woul d impose

unwanted costs on the foreign court system.

Finality is not the only goal

of full faith and credit,Z34 and it should not be the only goal of foreign
j udgment recognition practice. 235
Another reason not to accord greater preclusive effects to foreign
j udgments than they would have at home relates to the costs of the contrary
rule for l itigants .236

Further, in the context of a federal system, " domes-

in one by default. "); id. at 1 626-27 (stating that the absence of review in the original litigation by an
impartial tribunal, as well as the absence of "political, economic, and legal ties," justifies different
treatment) .
230 . See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 1 , at 585; see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 cmt. c (1 987) (discussing the refusal to recognize a
foreign judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant in the rendering court) . This formulation
masks an additional inquiry into the appropriateness of the rendering court's exercise of jurisdiction
according to a standard not employed, and perhaps not employable, by the rendering court but

RELATIONS

supported by the facts. See Juenger, supra note 1 58 , at 1 7 .
23 1 . See Smit, supra note 2 1 3 , at 6 3 & n. l26; Eugene F . Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by Prior
Litigation, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 742, 749-53 ( 1 979) .
232 . See Casad, supra note 210, a t 75 .
233 . See David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L.REv . 3 1 7 , 326-27,
341 (1 978) ("The risk of being bound in a later, unrelated, lawsuit to an adverse finding on an issue
not litigated in a prior suit might induce parties to litigate all possibl e issues to the utmost in the initial
proceeding . ") ; cj. James W. Moore & Thomas S. Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments ,
35 T U L . L . REV. 30 1 , 309- 1 0 ( 1 96 1 ) (noting that nonmutual issue preclusion ramifies initial litigation) .
234. See Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, T1te Scope of Full Faith and Credit to
49 COLUM. L.REv. 1 53 , 1 6 1 ( 1 949) .
235 . See Peterson, supra note 1 88, at 239-48; supra

Judgments,

text

accompanying notes 2 1 9-24.

236 . See supra text accompanying note 1 1 7 . Professor Peterson has described these costs in terms
of unifmmity in the following manner:
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tic law " can be an ambiguous referent. For one litigating abroad under a
regime of greater preclus ive effects and concerned about subsequent
litigation in this country, the rule could require research in the preclusion
law of fifty-one jurisdictions .237
Finally, where it is deemed appropriate to resort to "domestic law "
o r "domestic standards"23 8 a s a check on foreign judgment recognition
and enforcement practice, these and other concerns counsel against
insistence, where possible, o n detailed compliance w ith local law and in
favor of checks provided by uniform federal law.239 Usually, as in the

A second conception of the ordering principle turns the emphasis away from the
relations of nations and back to the relations of the litigant parties. This can best
be seen in its negative aspect. A flat refusal to recognize the effect of foreign
adjudication does not order the legal relationships of the litigants, but on the
contrary tends to confuse these by producing conflicting duties or contradictory
relations as between the two or more legal systems with which each of these
individuals has contact. The promotion of uniformity, whether in terms of status
or rights or duties, is the policy taproot of most choice of Jaw rules in the conflict
of laws scheme. That policy would seem to be intensified in its application to the
foreign judgments problem, because in the latter area the legal relations of the
individual have become in some degree fixed by the foreign adj udication.
Adherence to the standard set by the foreign judgment will promote this uniformity
j ust as ignoring the foreign j u dgment will tend to destroy it. Enforcement and
recognition can therefore serve an ordering principle with respect to individuals, by
providing a rational process for sorting out their private legal relations when they
are caught in a snarl of litigation in two different legal systems.
Peterson, supra note 2 1 3 , at 306 (footnote omitted); cf Casad, supra note 2 10 , at 75 ("[G]iving the
judgment more extensive issue preclusion effect than it would have in the rendering country could often
mean unanticipated prejudice to the losing party and unexpected benefit to the winner." ).

237. See Peterson, supra note 2 1 3 , at 307 n 85 ; supra text accompanying notes 1 6 1-63 . Of
course, uniform federal law could obviate this problem. See Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 , at 3 n.6
(discussing a draft of Swiss legislation that would federalize the "entire body of law dealing with
foreign country j udgments ").
.

238 . See supra text accompanying note 230.
239. Professor Juenger provides an acute analysis with respect to j urisdictional standards:
The largest single group of reporting countries measures the foreign
court's jurisdiction by reference to the bases found in their own laws. At first
blush, the "mirror-image principle" appears eminently fair. What could be more
reasonable than to concede as much jurisdiction to the rendition state as the
recognition state claims for itself? In reality, however, this version of the Golden
Rule is at once too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because the fornm 's

rules may be unduly restrictive, which jeopardizes the recognition ofjudgments that
rest on an otherwise unobjectionable basis. Conversely, the mirror-image principle
projects into the foreign legal system all of the recognition state's jurisdictional
assertions, however extravagant they may be. In effect, it endorses foreign
exorbitance by honoring j udgments of courts that lack a reasonably close
relationship to the dispute.
No doubt, the objective of the mirror-image principle, i.e., the congruence
of " indirect" and "direct" j urisdiction, has a certain visceral appeal. But the
adoption of a single standard for adjudication and recognition makes sense only if
that standard is finely tuned. To work well, the jurisdictional bases used must be,
on the one hand, sufficiently broad and, on the other, subj ect to constraints that
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cas e of federal l imitations on assertions of adj udicatory jurisdiction240 or
on provisions for notice and an opportunity to be heard,241 the rules w il l
have their source i n the Constitution .

Occas ionally, there may b e a

pertinent treaty that, although not dealing directly with recognition and
enforcement, indirectly constrains the operation of otherwise appl icable
law .

For instance, it would subvert the Hague Service Convention242 to

deny recognition to a foreign j udgment in an action in which service
compl ied w ith the Convention but did not satisfy the detailed requirements
of local l aw . 243
My hope, of course, is that before too l ong, the appl icable uniform
federal law w il l be provided by a treaty or series of treaties directly
regul ating the recognition and enforcement of foreign j udgments .

effectively curtail excessive assertions, Mechanisms to achieve fine-tuning exist
only in federal =tions such as the United States, whose Supreme Court exercises
constitutio=l control over state court jurisdiction,

and in quasi-federal systems such

as the European Communities, where the Brussels Convention establishes
jurisdictional rules that are binding on the member states and whose interpretation
is supervised by the Communities' Court of Justice.
Juenger, supra note 1 5 8 , at 15 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) .
240. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S . 102 (1 987).
241 . See, e.g. , Mennonite Bd . of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 ( 1 983) .
242. CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND EXTR.<\JUDICLA.L DOCUMENTS
C IVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, Nov. 1 5 , 1 9 65, 20 U .S .T. 3 6 1 , 658 U . N .T.S. 1 6 3 .
243 . See Ackermann v . Levine, 788 F.2d 8 3 0 (2d Cir. 1 986) .
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